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This article revisits and examines whether the fairness and justice
doctrine of Armstrong v. United States1 can justify and fashion standards
of review to protect the right to just compensation of the Takings Clause.2
The Court has relied on Armstrong to show the purpose of the Takings
Clause in many takings decisions.3 However, can Armstrong serve a
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greater purpose? In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the United States Supreme
Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to justify the need
for a standard of review to protect the right to just compensation.4 The
Court transported questionable constitutional doctrine to validate Justice
Holmes’s regulatory takings theory. Yet, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court applied Armstrong’s
fairness and justice doctrine to justify not applying standards of review
to a complete range of factual theories of regulatory takings theory.5 There-
fore, the Court leads one to ask whether the Armstrong fairness and jus-
tice doctrine should be considered in justifying the selection of standards
of review and principles to protect the right to just compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulatory takings theory and analytics have generated little
takings doctrine but have formed a disconnected mass of United States
Supreme Court decisions that have been, and will remain, evidence of
theoretical and analytical failures in the maturation of Takings Clause6
jurisprudence until regulatory takings doctrine evolves.7 Evidence exists
of the absence of unique theoretical and analytical doctrine to guide the
development of Justice Holmes’s regulatory takings theory and the Court’s
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
7 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 288–95.
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justification of takings standards of review and principles.8 This particular
absence has led to the doctrinal importation of other legal doctrines9 and
doctrinal avoidance of the economic principles in determining, justifying,
and fashioning takings standards of review and principles.10 Regulatory
takings jurisprudence is the application of mostly ad hoc factual inquiries11
and vague propositions in regulatory takings claims.12
Any theoretical and analytical doctrine13 should conjoin (connect
through a line of analysis) standards of review and coalesce (create a
coherent substantive body) takings principles in the growth and develop-
ment of a stable, descriptive regulatory takings theory. Yet, this doctrinal
importation and avoidance show a failure to develop effective regulatory
takings doctrine to grow and develop regulatory takings theory.14 As a con-
sequence, this doctrinal importation and avoidance show few, if any, United
States Supreme Court precedents that justify, establish, and fashion tak-
ings standards of review and principles providing proportionality between
8 See id. at 289.
9 See id. at 236–37.
10 See id. at 272.
11 See id. at 264.
12 See id. at 289.
13 See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
517 passim (2006). Professors Tiller and Cross identify several forms and types of legal
doctrine. See id. at 517. These forms can be factually intensive inquiries or broad, general
propositions. Id. Doctrine can be generally described as standards or rules. See id.
Professors Tiller and Cross describe these forms:
Legal doctrine sets the terms for future resolution of cases in an
area. Doctrine may take many forms; it may be fact-dependent, and
therefore limited, or sweeping in its breadth. One doctrinal distinction
commonly discussed in the law is the distinction between “rules” and
“standards.” Rules are strict requirements that define the answer to a
dispute, once the predicate facts are established. A rule is something
like “any subsequent and unauthorized use of another’s mark constitutes
trademark infringement.” Standards, by contrast, are more amorphous
guides to resolving disputes, often listing a set of factors to be considered
and balanced. A standard would be a law that directed “trademark in-
fringement occurs when there is a likelihood of confusion between the
senior and junior marks, as determined by weighing the following
factors . . . .” Both doctrinal approaches are found in the law, but there
is little analysis of why one might prefer a rule or a standard and what
the subsequent effects of the two types of doctrine might be. It is fre-
quently presumed that standards leave space for more ideological judg-
ing, but this claim has never been demonstrated.
Id. at 517–18 (citation omitted).
14 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 238.
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government responses and the public burden imposed on landowners;
nor does this doctrinal importation and avoidance show precedents creating
a greater predictability in the outcome of disputes regarding these re-
sponses and newly imposed burdens.15 This article seeks to show that some-
where between Justice Holmes’s regulatory takings theory,16 and the
15 See id. at 236.
16 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal,
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, set forth the analytical foundation of regulatory
takings theory when he stated:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously
the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due pro-
cess clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain mag-
nitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends
upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment
of the legislature, but it always is open to interested parties to contend
that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power.
Id.
In addition, Justice Holmes set forth the substantive foundation of regulatory takings
theory when he stated:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional cases, like the blowing up
of a house to stop a conflagration, go—and if they go beyond the general
rule, whether they do not stand as much upon tradition as upon prin-
ciple. In general it is not plain that a man’s misfortunes or necessities
will justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor’s shoulders. We are
in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change. As we already have
said, this is a question of degree—and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions. But we regard this as going beyond any of the cases
decided by this Court.
Id. at 415–16 (citation omitted).
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. Debendictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, stated both the analytical and substantive importance
of Pennsylvania Coal when he stated that:
[T]he holding in Pennsylvania Coal . . . has for 65 years been the foun-
dation of our “regulatory takings” jurisprudence. We have, for example,
frequently relied on the admonition that “if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.” Thus, even were I willing to assume that the
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal standing alone is reasonably subject to an
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Court’s takings analytics and substance,17 is the eminent need for regula-
tory takings doctrine to execute takings theory. This article explores the
need to move, though with caution, regulatory takings theory beyond
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.18 This article proffers that unique
regulatory takings doctrine is necessary to execute less predictable
regulatory takings theory.19 This doctrine justifies standards of review and
fashions principles reflective on Justice Holmes’s values of private prop-
erty and limits of legislative judgment.20
This article consists of an introduction, six explanatory parts, and
a conclusion that illustrate how the meager beginning of Armstrong v.
United States21 catalogs the destructive nature of government actions
to redistribute public obligations to groups and individuals in society.22
These parts examine and discuss how Armstrong can be viewed as tak-
ings doctrine with the substantive capacity and analytical force to deter-
mine, justify, and fashion takings standards of review and principles. The
Introduction presents the doctrinal argument that seeks to persuade
federal and state courts to give greater protection to the guarantees of the
right to just compensation. This argument embodies Justice Holmes’s
notion that the Takings,23 Due Process,24 and Contract25 Clauses are fully
complementary. Part I introduces the theory and analytics, which Justice
Holmes set forth and the Court subsequently followed, that secure consti-
tutional protection of private property rights by justifying and establish-
ing takings standards of review and principles that ensure proportionality
interpretation that renders more than half the discussion “advisory,”
I would have no doubt that our repeated reliance on that opinion estab-
lishes it as a cornerstone of the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment’s
Just Compensation Clause.
Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Now, the jurisprudential question is how the United States Supreme Court will
move, execute, extend, and validate the analytics and substance of Justice Holmes’s regu-
latory takings theory in Pennsylvania Coal.
17 See infra Part I and accompanying notes (discussing the significance of the seminal
takings cases decided by the United States Supreme Court).
18 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393.
19 See infra Part VI and accompanying notes (discussing the significance of the application
of Armstrong to takings cases).
20 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
21 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
22 See infra Parts IV–VI.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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between government regulatory responses and the public burdens on land-
owners. Part II sets forth economic, policy-making, and constitutional justi-
fications to establish and fashion a range of regulatory takings standards
of review and principles under the Takings Clause. Part III discusses the
constitutional need and ultimate constitutional source for takings doctrine
to justify, fashion, and establish takings standards of review and principles
to guide and control the growth and development of regulatory takings
theory. These first three parts show how the Court has used the
Armstrong doctrine and should continue to develop its use of the
Armstrong doctrine to determine, justify, and fashion deferential, interme-
diate, and per se standards of review and other principles under the
Takings Clause.26 One or two Court decisions may not a priori create
constitutional or takings doctrine that can survive constitutional muster,
but these decisions may still serve as the genesis of stabilizing theoretical-
analytical doctrine in a field of law unsettled for slightly less than a
century,27 circa 1922.28
A judicial backdrop of several cases may go far in showing the
need for theoretical-analytical doctrine to conjoin and coalesce a morass
or body of unruly or untamed takings standards and principles.29 Conse-
quently, Parts IV–VI examine judicial support and doctrinal justifications
for takings doctrine to determine, justify, and fashion standards of review
and other takings principles. Part IV examines Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency30 and Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island31 to show the presence and need for the Armstrong takings doctrine
to weigh and balance conflicting government objectives, economic needs,
and social welfare concerns of community policies under the Takings
Clause. Part V discusses the need to rely on firm constitutional doctrine
to test means and ends of distributing and redistributing the public
burdens and benefits of community policy-making for economic, political,
and social programs. Part VI discusses the need for constitutional doctrine
to address public and private concerns regarding benefits and advan-
tages of regulation to further government objectives burdening private
property.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see infra Part VI and accompanying notes (discussing the
significance of the application of Armstrong to takings cases).
27 See infra Part I.C.
28 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29 See Tiller & Cross, sup ra note 13.
30 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
31 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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Finally, the Conclusion demonstrates uses or applications of
Armstrong doctrine in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Palazzolo
to find and support, respectively, proportionality under the Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City32 inquiry and the Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council33 per se test to create a neophytic doctrine. The
neophytic doctrine includes consideration of the nature of government
action and the economic effects on property rights of burdensome govern-
ment regulation.34 This neophyte is more than ambiguous case law or
superfluous judicial dicta.35 Instead, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
and Palazzolo elevate Armstrong’s widely used language that embodies
the Framer’s purpose and intent of the Takings Clause to a basic and
inherent takings doctrine.36 Purposely, this neophytic doctrine can
determine, justify, and fashion proportionate standards of review and
takings principles to resolve claims arising under the Takings Clause and
regulatory takings theory of Pennsylvania Coal.37
I. RETURNING TO HOLMESIAN THEORY AND ANALYTICS IN TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE38
Land use, real estate, and corporate attorneys, and a few federal
trial and appellate judges have not been successful in persuading the
Court to justify, establish, and fashion standards of review providing
heightened scrutiny of regulation and takings principles providing greater
substantive protection for private property rights.39 These standards and
principles would apply to land use, environmental and social regulation,
and state and municipal condemnations for economic development and
revitalization.40 Landowners challenge these takings of land and other
private property as repugnant or a violation of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.41 Simply, the Court has rejected constitutional
32 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
33 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
34 See infra Conclusion.
35 See infra Conclusion.
36 See infra Conclusion.
37 See infra Conclusion.
38 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
39 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 242–43.
40 See id. at 294.
41 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
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arguments supporting the creation of stringent standards of review to
weigh and balance legislative judgment and has refused to establish tak-
ings principles or general propositions to judge the economic effects of
regulation in regulatory takings claims.42
A. Diverging Lines of Cases and Approaches of the Rehnquist
Court
The determination of proportionality between government responses
and newly shifted burdens, especially economic and business expectations
and impacts, has resulted in two distinct lines of takings disputes.43 The
Court has shown a markedly different approach to determine outcomes of
each line of disputes where regulatory takings theory of Pennsylvania Coal
calls for the application of a factual inquiry, gives the greater weight to leg-
islative judgment, and finds little or no use for general takings principles
or propositions.44 In one line of disputes, the Court refused to impose
heightened scrutiny on a public use claim in Kelo v. City of New London;45
to create an intermediate standard of review for takings claims challeng-
ing a rent control regulation in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.;46 to impose
42 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 569 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
535 U.S. at 302. Pennsylvania Coal includes weighing, balancing and judging public
needs and legislative and private interests and economic effects as aspects of regulatory
takings theory. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). These analytics
seek a proportionate redistribution of public burdens and distribution of public benefits
in American communities. See id. at 415–16. Federal and state courts are subject to
Pennsylvania Coal, which establishes a factual inquiry to judge regulatory takings dis-
putes under presumptively normal circumstances. See id. Moreover, these courts are
bound by Pennsylvania Coal’s allocation of the greater weight or deference to legislative
judgment and actions subject to judicial scrutiny. See id. Pennsylvania Coal’s factual
inquiry and legislative deference permit courts to ascertain the proportionality of the
balance between public needs and landowner obligations that affect the redistribution of
public burdens, thus determining when government goes too far. Id.
43 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 247–52.
44 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415–16.
45 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. In Kelo, the Court concluded that heightened scrutiny is not the
appropriate standard of review for public use claims challenging an exercise of eminent
domain power to take or condemn private property for community revitalization or eco-
nomic development regulations, policies, or projects. Id. at 484–85. Instead, the Court
held that rational basis (actually a deferential test) was the most appropriate standard of
review when legislative bodies exercise eminent domain power to condemn private prop-
erties for public use to further economic development, giving an expansive interpretation
to the Public Use Clause. Id. at 488–89.
46 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). In Lingle, the Court concluded that heightened scrutiny does
not exist as an intermediate standard of review for takings claims challenging an exercise
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a categorical per se test on a moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council;47 or to strengthen review of the economic impact and expectations
analyses in Palazzolo.48 Moreover, the Court refused to impose heightened
of police power to impose rent control obligations on the owners and landlords of
commercial private property to protect tenants from unjust rent increases. Id. at 545. The
Court held that the “substantially advances” language of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980), does not create an intermediate standard of review for a rent control
statute challenged as a regulatory taking of private property for public use. See Lingle,
545 U.S. at 548.
47 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002). In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Court concluded
that a heightened scrutiny or per se test is not the appropriate standard of review for
regulatory takings claims challenging an exercise of police power to impose an interim
development control or land use moratorium to control development for roughly thirty-
two months. Id. at 341–42. Instead, the Court held that the deferential Penn Central
inquiry is the most appropriate standard of review when legislative bodies exercise police
power to control development while municipalities, counties, and agencies are creating
or modifying environmental, land use, and growth management regulatory schemes for
communities and regions. Id. at 342.
48 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2002). In Palazzolo, the Court concluded
that the acquisition of land that had been subject to land use or environmental
regulations, but for which the grantor had never filed or perfected a ripe regulatory
takings claim, would cut off or deny the grantee (new landowner) the right to challenge
this regulation under the Takings Clause, though neither could the grantor (original
owner) have done so due to the lack of a ripe regulatory takings claim. Id. at 629–30. The
Court held that wetlands regulations did not deny all economically viable use of the
property in question, in that a few acres of the tract of land could be used to construct one
or more houses, and remanded the decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for it to
apply the Penn Central standard. Id. at 632.
In Palazzolo, Justices O’Connor and Scalia did not agree on how lower courts
should decide the takings issues regarding the determination of the economic impact and
investment-backed expectations of the landowners. Compare id. at 632–36 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), with id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor would apply the
Penn Central inquiry and takings principles to the financial, economic, regulatory, and
political circumstances, such as original land value, to determine whether a regulatory
taking had occurred through the economic effects of the wetlands regulation. Id. at 636
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor stated that “[t]he Takings Clause requires
careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.”
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia would rely on estab-
lished takings principles, such as background principles of common law, but would not con-
sider whether past regulatory circumstances that were not background principles of common
law caused or played any role in an interference with reasonable, distinct, investment-
backed expectations. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated:
In my view, the fact that a restriction existed at the time the pur-
chaser took title (other than a restriction forming part of the “background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance,” Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)) should have no
bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so sub-
stantial as to constitute a taking.
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scrutiny to find a takings but instead gave less weight to the economic
impact and made a facial takings challenge almost insurmountable in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debendictis.49 Simply, this line
of cases, or their analytical approach, finds a reasonable proportionality
between these government responses and their private impacts under a
deferential analysis. This line of disputes and its analytical approaches
show little need to expose regulation, either means or ends, to greater
scrutiny in testing the proportionality between regulation and its public
burden when regulation redistributes public burdens and creates public
benefits.
In the other line of disputes, the Court has accepted common law
and constitutional arguments and even a more pragmatic argument50 in
Id.
49 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). The Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n Court affirmed the
doctrine underpinning the difficulty of mounting a successful challenge to a federal, state,
or local regulation on its face when the government has not had time to apply the
legislation to a parcel or tract of land and thus its economic, social, or political impacts
remain technically unknown. Id. at 495–96. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, the
petitioners filed a facial takings claim that challenged the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania legislative act on its face or its application to a specific parcel or tract of
land. Id. The Court referred to this challenge as “an uphill battle.” Id. at 496. Justice
Stevens, writing for majority, stated:
Petitioners thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on
the Act as a taking. The hill is made especially steep because petitioners
have not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it commercially im-
practicable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests
in western Pennsylvania.
Id. at 495–96.
50 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 487–88. In Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n, the Court relied on the nature of the government action to justify its decision and
to distinguish a public interest from private interests protecting community needs. Id.
Justice Stevens added pragmatism or practice when he stated:
Thus, the Subsidence Act differs from the Kohler Act in critical and
dispositive respects. With regard to the Kohler Act, the Court believed
that the Commonwealth had acted only to ensure against damage to
some private landowners’ homes. Justice Holmes stated that if the pri-
vate individuals needed support for their structures, they should not
have “take[n] the risk of acquiring only surface rights.” Here, by contrast,
the Commonwealth is acting to protect the public interest in health, the
environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. That private indi-
viduals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the Commonwealth from
exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance.
The Subsidence Act is a prime example that “circumstances may so
change in time . . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at
other times . . . would be a matter of purely private concern.”
Id. (citation omitted).
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several takings disputes creating standards of review and taking prin-
ciples providing heightened scrutiny and stringent economic effects and
expectations analyses, respectively.51 Specifically, the Court relied on a
constitutional argument to limit the conditional demands on the exercise
of a fundamental right by requiring a minimum connection between the
purpose of legislative judgment and the implementation of its regulation
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.52 The Court went even fur-
ther by explicitly accepting problematic constitutional doctrine to limit
conditional demands on the exercise of a questionable fundamental right
by requiring heightened scrutiny between legislative judgment and the
direct cause for the exercise of this judgment in Dolan v. City of Tigard,53
51 See, e.g., id. at 470.
52 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). In Nollan, the Court concluded that conditions and prohibitions
do not always go hand-in-hand and showed some reliance on the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions in protecting the right to just compensation by stating:
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same
legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should
not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not con-
stitute a taking. We agree. Thus, if the Commission attached to the per-
mit some condition that would have protected the public’s ability to see
the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house—for example,
a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences—so long as the
Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed
it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the
condition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer
to the facts of the present case), the condition would be constitutional
even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a view-
ing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean
their new house would interfere. Although such a requirement, consti-
tuting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would
have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development
permit, the Commission’s assumed power to forbid construction of the
house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must surely in-
clude the power to condition construction upon some concession by the
owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end. If
a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate
exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange
to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition
which accomplishes the same purpose is not.
Id. at 836–37.
The Court concluded that prohibition and conditions cannot be used interchangeably
in all circumstances of land use regulation and conditions may exact an interest in land
for which government must compensate. Id. at 837.
53 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). In Dolan, the Court concluded that the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions protected the right to just compensation, contrasting Dolan against
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and agreed with common law doctrine to limit land use environmental
restrictions on beachfront development in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.54 Moreover, the Court has accepted common law argu-
ments to protect the right to transfer under transferable development
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) and Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Court stated:
The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited,
however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present case. First,
they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire
areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to
condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on
the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that
she deed portions of the property to the city. In Nollan we held that gov-
ernmental authority to exact such a condition was circumscribed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the well-settled doctrine of
“unconstitutional conditions,” the government may not require a person
to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just com-
pensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit
sought has little or no relationship to the property.
Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to choose between
the building permit and her right under the Fifth Amendment to just
compensation for the public easements.
Id. at 385–86 (citation omitted).
In Dolan, the Court explicitly concluded that a condition on receipt of public or govern-
ment benefit may cause a constitutional violation, namely the surrender of a fundamental,
if not an important, right. Id. at 392.
54 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). In Lucas, the Court concluded that implied limitations or
restrictions that were part of land title at common law could be used to restrict use and
development by writing that:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only
if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with. This accords, we think, with our “takings” jurisprudence, which
has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens re-
garding the content of, and the State’s power over, the “bundle of rights”
that they acquire when they obtain title to property. It seems to us that
the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be
restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the
State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; “[a]s long recognized,
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Id. at 1027.
In Lucas, the Court also concluded that denial of beneficial or economically viable use
could exist if this severe limitation had been part of the title to the land at common. Id.
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rights (“TDR”) regulation in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency55
and to prevent the abrogation of the rights of descent and devise in
limiting the impact of government regulation on descendants’ estates in
Hodel v. Irving.56 Simply, this line of disputes and analytical approaches
show the lack of reasonable proportionality between regulation and its
public burden and expose this regulation, either means or ends, to
greater scrutiny in testing the proportionality when particular regulation
redistributes public burdens from government to landowners.
B. Holmesian Theory and Analytics in Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence57
These lines of cases,58 or their analytical approaches, are doctrinally
deficient by lacking doctrine within their own constitutional or theoret-
ical substance, namely the Takings Clause.59 They undermine Holmesian
theory and analytics of regulatory takings60 by developing and applying the
regulatory principles on an ad hoc approach with little theoretical and
analytical guidance of a takings doctrine to establish standards of review
55 520 U.S. 725, 741 (1997). In Suitum, the Court limited the impact of TDR regulation
on the right to transfer by a landowner when it stated:
[A]s to Suitum’s right to transfer her TDRs, the only contingency apart
from private market demand turns on the right of the agency to deny
approval for a specific transfer on grounds that the buyer’s use of the
TDRs would violate the terms of the scheme or other local land use regu-
lation, and the right of a local regulatory body to deny transfer approval
for the latter reason. . . . While a particular sale is subject to approval,
salability is not, and the agency’s own position assumes that there are
many potential, lawful buyers for Suitum’s TDRs, whose receipt of those
rights would unquestionably be approved.
Id. at 741.
In Suitum, although the takings issue involved the valuation of TDRs, the sale or
transfer of land would only be an issue if it violated land use or environmental regulation.
Id. at 729, 741.
56 481 U.S. 704, 716–17 (1987); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979) (recognizing the importance of the right to exclude others in the bundle of rights
and imposing a limit on government regulation to redistribute public burdens, namely
providing access to a dredged pond).
57 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
58 See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes (establishing two divergent lines of cases
and their analytical approaches).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.; see infra Part I.B and accompanying notes (discussing the
nature and force of Holmesian analytics embodied by regulatory takings theory).
60 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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and general principles.61 Putting aside the Court’s predilection for ideo-
logically different views from the cathedral, the major difference between
the two groups of Court decisions is that the latter62 has grounds in
constitutional or other doctrine protecting the right to just compensation
as the constitutional means to protect private property under the Takings
Clause. The latter group is represented mostly by Lucas63 and seems to
conclude that precisely-framed and narrowly-tailored propositions, which
include takings standards of review and general principles, are less likely
to disrupt regulatory and policy-making processes and programs.64 These
propositions and standards are more likely to readjust the proportionality
between the exercise of legislative judgment and the limitation of the
right to just compensation in redistributing public burdens and distribut-
ing public benefits of market, industrial, educational, and other changes
in our society.65 This limitation protects property rights by forcing gov-
ernment to weigh the costs of redistributing public burdens and distrib-
uting new public benefits through condemnation, regulation, contract,
and other actions likely to take private property.66 However, the first group
61 See infra Part II and accompanying notes (discussing the lack of, and need for, takings
doctrine in justifying and establishing standards of review and general principles).
62 See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
63 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
64 See infra Part III.B and accompanying notes (discussing balancing takings standards
of review against government policy-making processes).
65 See Tiller & Cross, supra note 13, at 525–26. Professors Tiller and Cross discuss the
impact of legal doctrine on judicial decision-making, stating:
Mark Richards and Bert Kritzer found that certain Supreme Court deci-
sions established new “jurisprudential regimes” that dictated the structure
of subsequent decisions. The decisions had influence by “establishing
which case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting
the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ in assessing
case factors.” This approach came close to a true study of doctrine and
found some effect even at the Supreme Court level. The research did not
address the questions of why the Justices crafted specific language or
exactly how different language mattered, but it established the very
important point that doctrine does matter in future decisions.
As noted above, the primary power of doctrine lies in its ability to
influence decisions by lower courts. A number of political scientists have
studied this particular issue and found that Supreme Court doctrine does
appear to drive subsequent lower court opinions.
Id. (citation omitted).
66 See infra Part III.A and accompanying notes (discussing Court efforts to consider costs
of redistributing public burdens and distributing public benefits when these actions may
result in the taking of private property).
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of Court decisions67 share an underlying dependence on a uniquely ad hoc,
factual inquiry of Penn Central68 to weigh policy, regulatory, and eco-
nomic circumstances of regulatory takings disputes.69 This ad hoc factual
inquiry is likely not to limit sufficient government power, likely to defer
to government in the redistribution of public burdens and benefits, and
likely to skew proportionality to favor a greater redistribution of burdens
to holders of property rights.70 Looking at both groups, one can find the
need for stable, consistent takings doctrine to determine and judge the
need for takings standards of review and principles. This article offers a
doctrinal solution. Sadly, both groups contribute too little to the regula-
tory takings theory of Pennsylvania Coal.71
The competing lines of cases show that regulatory takings theory
suffers an analytic and substantive disconnect between the development
of sound takings doctrine and the application of takings standards of
review and principles.72 The problem is that community policy-makers
will encounter policy uncertainty, fiscal liability, and legal risks.73 In
addition, landowners and other private property owners will face regu-
latory liability, economic uncertainty, and financial risks.74 Both govern-
ments and these owners face constant exposure to a confusing takings
environment: the indefinite nature and piecemeal development of federal
takings standards of review and general takings principles that scruti-
nize and judge, respectively, land use, growth management, and environ-
mental and other regulation.75 Takings doctrine inhering to the Takings
Clause is needed to alleviate much of the existing uncertainty surround-
ing the constitutional conflict between government judgment and prop-
erty rights foisted onto communities and states by the Court’s inability
to use its theory to establish and develop a coherent body of analytics and
67 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 569 (2005); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 483 U.S. 104 (1978).
68 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 483 U.S. at 104.
69 See infra Part II and accompanying notes (discussing the development of the ad hoc Penn
Central inquiry in weighing the circumstances surrounding takings disputes).
70 See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
71 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
72 See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
73 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the Armstrong doctrine and its
capacity to address the needs of community policymaking).
74 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
75 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
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substance.76 Consequently, our first step is to know and accept the existence
of regulatory takings theory and to look within the Court’s takings prece-
dents for constitutional doctrine upon which to build analytics and sub-
stance. Therefore, this article offers a doctrinal solution that, on the first
hand, conjoins the factual analytics of Penn Central,77 economic analytics
of Lucas,78 and constitutional analytics of Dolan,79 and, on the other hand,
coalesces the weak legal-economic theory underlying Penn Central,80 the
infirm legal-policy theory of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,81 and the
unfulfilled temporary-permanent dichotomy of First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.82
C. Emerging Takings Doctrine of the Holmesian Theory and
Analytics
This jurisprudential solution is the use, development, and applica-
tion of Armstrong to conjoin analytics and coalesce substance of takings
76 See infra Parts II.B and III.B and accompanying notes (discussing the need for a coherent
takings doctrine to clear up uncertainty with property rights and government action).
77 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 483 U.S. 104 (1978); see also infra Part
II and accompanying notes (discussing the development of the ad hoc, factual inquiry of
Penn Central (the Penn Central inquiry) to weigh regulatory, policy, and economic cir-
cumstances in resolving regulatory takings claims).
78 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also infra Part II.A and
accompanying notes (discussing the common law grounds to justify the Lucas per se test
to resolve regulatory takings claims involving a denial of all economically viable use).
79 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
80 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 483 U.S. at 104; see also infra Part II.A and accompanying
notes (discussing the constitutional grounds to justify creating heightened scrutiny in
Dolan and Nollan to resolve regulatory takings claims involving objectives and needs for
land dedication conditions).
81 See 535 U.S. 302 (2002); see also infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes (discussing
the application of takings principles in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council to resolve
regulatory takings claims by weighing heavily the impact on municipal policymaking in
finding established regulation unconstitutional).
82 482 U.S. 304 (1987). In First English, the Court concluded that government regulations
can create a temporary taking of private property that would require the payment of just
compensation. Id. at 322. The Court stated:
Here we must assume that the Los Angeles County ordinance has
denied appellant all use of its property for a considerable period of years,
and we hold that invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair
value for the use of the property during this period of time would be a
constitutionally insufficient remedy.
Id.
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jurisprudence. The Armstrong83 doctrine embodies the fairness, or equity,
and justice, or process, of the Takings Clause and its intent where the
limitation on government power is a great economic force and less per-
sonal burden for government actions. This limitation must not succumb
to the deferential weight or preferential need for public needs, objectives,
and purposes in redistributing public burdens and creating public bene-
fits to resolve conflicting public needs and private opportunities.84
Armstrong’s most representative doctrinal statement is: “The Fifth Amend-
ment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”85
It is well settled that the Armstrong doctrinal statement is a firm,
resilient measure of Armstrong’s ability to contribute a substantive pur-
pose and intent to takings disputes,86 but its use must also include a deeper
analytical capability and broader substantive force to execute both purpose
and intent.87 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,88 the Court’s insight-
ful application and confident use show Armstrong’s ability to contribute
analytics and substance in light of Pennsylvania Coal’s89 descriptive
regulatory takings theory.90 The Court’s explicit use, if not definitive
application, creates a bridge between constitutional theory and its exe-
cuting or implementing constitutional doctrine. This bridge or portal is the
path for regulatory takings disputes and claims raising takings issues
requiring the application of constitutional or other doctrine to justify,
establish, and fashion takings standards of review and principles.91
As stated above, one or two Court decisions may not a priori create
constitutional or takings doctrine that can survive constitutional muster
in guiding the creation and development of takings standards of review
83 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
84 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (examining the need for an Armstrong-based
takings doctrine conflicting needs of the government and private property owners).
85 See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
86 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
303–04 (2002).
87 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the need for Armstrong doctrine
to have expanded analytical capability and broader substantive force).
88 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 303–04.
89 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
90 See infra Parts V–VI and accompanying notes (discussing the use of Armstrong doctrine
to justify, fashion, and apply takings standards of review and principles).
91 See infra Parts V–VI and accompanying notes.
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and principles.92 Somewhere, as with all things, there must be a genesis.
In the beginning, Armstrong may serve only to birth, if not stabilize,
remnants of theoretical-analytical doctrine in a field of law unsettled for
slightly less than a century, circa 1922.93 The two lines of analytical ap-
proaches go far in showing the need for theoretical-analytical doctrine to
conjoin and coalesce a morass or body of unruly or untamed takings stan-
dards and principles.94 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Palazzolo
go far in elevating Armstrong.95 Moreover, the repeated and insistent use
of Armstrong to identify the Framers’ purpose and intent for the Takings
Clause96 is hollow.97 To give effect to the Framer’s intent and purpose,
Armstrong98 must logically expand the theoretical capacity and analytical
forces to guide and execute the Takings Clause, by creating substance and
analytics. For the time being, Armstrong is either the genesis or stabi-
lizer of takings substance and analytics to determine, justify, and fashion
proportionate standards of review and general takings principles to
resolve takings claims arising under the Takings Clause and regulatory
takings theory of Pennsylvania Coal.99
II. FINDING TAKINGS DOCTRINE AMONG THE COURT’S TAKINGS
DECISIONS
Armstrong illustrated the destructive nature of government actions
to redistribute public obligations to groups and individuals in society,
92 See supra Introduction and accompanying notes.
93 See Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 615–17 (1996).
94 See supra Part I.A (discussing the diverging lines of Taking Clause cases).
95 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 303–04
(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2002).
96 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
97 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48–49 (1960) (observing that the Fifth
Amendment was intended to “bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be bourne by the public as a
whole”). Id. at 49.
98 Id.
99 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see Armstrong, 364 U.S. at
49 (“The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”); see also Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Central to Lingle: The
Long Backwards Road, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593, 600 (2007) (arguing that the
Armstrong decision established a “relatively strong statement about property rights,” but
without a “set formula” to evaluate subsequent cases).
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notwithstanding the most worthy objectives of community and state policy-
makers.100 Armstrong possesses the substantive capacity and analytical
force necessary to become regulatory takings doctrine. Its force and capacity
enable it to determine, justify, and fashion takings principles and stan-
dards of review. This doctrine is necessary to complete the guarantee to
protect private property rights by justifying and establishing takings stan-
dards of review and principles. The Takings Clause can reach its fullness
when its applications establish proportionality between policymaking
responses to community needs and public burdens of land owners under
regulation of land development impacts, natural resources degradation,
environmental quality, social welfare problems, or other public areas.
Part II sets forth economic, policymaking, and constitutional justifica-
tions to establish and fashion a range of standards of review under the
Takings Clause.
A. Eliminating Factual Theories to Dispose of Standards of Review
and Other Principles
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council101 and Palazzolo102 offer renewed
hope to attorneys who have yet to be successful, since Dolan103 (nearly
thirteen years ago), in finding constitutional doctrine to justify greater pro-
tection of the right to just compensation, which, in turn, means providing
greater protection to private property rights. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council104 and Palazzolo’s105 strong reliance on Armstrong pass the point
of using mere dicta to illuminate or illustrate points of law and their
applications or lack thereof. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council applied
Armstrong to evaluate the utility of and eliminate the need for factual
theories underlain by a full set or complete range of standards of review
under the Takings Clause.106 One cannot ignore that evaluating and elimi-
nating factual theories by using the application of a range of standards
of review and takings principles calls into play constitutional doctrine
100 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 41–46.
101 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336–42
(2002).
102 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–32 (2001).
103 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
104 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 332–35.
105 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–18.
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 333–35.
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possessing, and thereafter birthing, enough substance, analysis, and rea-
soning to determine, justify, and fashion standards of review and other
principles under the Takings Clause.107 These theories are underlain, if
not illustrative, of the full set and complete range of takings standards
of review, where such theories illustrate deferential,108 intermediate,109
and strict scrutiny,110 and a categorical per se test,111 supported or reliant
upon an ad hoc inquiry,112 constitutional doctrine113 and common law prin-
ciple,114 respectively. The jurisprudential question, then, is: If Armstrong
can evaluate, differentiate and eliminate standards of review and prin-
ciples among the complete set of takings standards of review, then how far
can it go to determine, justify, and fashion a takings standard of review
or principle to protect the right to just compensation, including its consti-
tutionally valid and repugnant condemnations and regulations?115
107 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.; see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. The Court applied the uncon-
stitutional doctrine to determine, justify, and fashion the rough proportionality test, an
intermediate standard of review, to review takings claims involving land dedication con-
ditions. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. Equally important, the Court evaluated and eliminated
various state standards of review that had been applied to review takings claims involving
land dedication of conditions. Id. at 389–91. In Dolan, the Court’s evaluation, elimination,
and selection of a standard of review took place in light of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Id. at 385.
108 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702–03
(1999) (concluding that deferential review is appropriate for legislative decisions); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (finding that zoning
regulations need not amount to a takings).
109 See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (concluding that an intermediate standard is
appropriate to review adjudicative decisions requesting an interest in land).
110 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (finding
that a local regulation permitting the location of an antenna on the rooftop of a private
structure was a physical occupation and thus a physical taking subject to strict scrutiny
by the Court, reviewing both ends and means).
111 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (concluding that a cate-
gorical per se standard is most appropriate when government denies all economically viable
use of the land).
112 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 483 U.S. at 124–25 (fashioning a deferential test based on
deference to government in making zoning and other land use regulations of property rights
to further land use and other policies).
113 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (fashioning an intermediate standard of review under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
114 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (fashioning a categorical per se test that is based on the
common law doctrine).
115 See infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes (examining the use of Armstrong doctrine
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council to examine factual theories put forth by the United
States Supreme Court).
336 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:315
B. Jurisprudential Need to Justify Standards of Review and Other
Principles
Of course, a single judicial decision may not create takings doctrine,
but the intrigue of examining the long standing use and more recent appli-
cation of Armstrong to attenuate the purpose, accentuate the intent, and
perpetuate the force of the Takings Clause cannot go unnoticed by scholars
seeking a foundational but compelling means to conjoin various threads
of takings standards and coalesce the morass of principles and precedents
into a coherent, harmonious body of takings analytics and substance be-
fitting the Holmesian theory and analytics116 that underpin Pennsylvania 
116 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal,
Justice Holmes sets forth the threshold percept as the development of substance law by
government to perpetuate society, but with incidental effects on private property rights
not exceeding limits already existing in the Due Process and Contract Clauses to preserve
private property. Id. In this same line of thinking, Justice Holmes established that the
incidental effects are an implied limitation on the value, use, and other rights of private
property. Id. Moreover, Justice Holmes concluded commenting on this precept by stating
that an implied limitation without limits or bounds may weaken the Due Process and
Contract Clauses. Id. In setting forth the percept grounding regulatory takings theory,
Justice Holmes stated:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously
the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due
process clauses are gone.
Id.
Therefore, any analytic of regulatory takings theory must be underpinned by doctrine
grounded on Justice Holmes’s precept binding together limits on government powers and
protection of private property rights where the exercise of government powers limits the
values or rights of private property to such an extent that the protection of the private
property under the Contract or Due Process Clause is null and void.
Justice Holmes’s precept analyzes incidental effects and scrutinizes government
policymaking to determine if this regulation extends beyond the limitations of the Due
Process and Contract Clauses and denies protection to private property. Pennsylvania
Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. Justice Holmes starts the economic or property analytics by first
judging the extent of the regulation of property value, and enters economics through
judging the magnitude of any incidental effects. Id. at 413–14. However, Justice Holmes
grounds regulatory takings theory in common law factual or policy analytics, wherein the
second consideration would be the government’s judgment and giving the greater weight
to this judgment by retaining deference to government policymaking for the public safety,
health and welfare. Id. In setting forth the analytic logic of balancing economics and politics
(policymaking), Justice Holmes stated:
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Coal. In constitutional and common law jurisprudence, Holmesian theory
and analytics must create or rely on fundamental doctrine to justify and
establish, and then develop and use, means-ends tests, principles, and
their applications under a stable theoretical takings thread growing from
the Takings Clause.117 This article outlines our approach to furthering
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent
of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not
in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compen-
sation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular
facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but
it always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has
gone beyond its constitutional power.
Id. at 413.
Holmesian analytics include weighing the magnitude of incidental effects against the
impact of repugnant incidental effects on the values of private property beyond the reach
of Due Process and Contract Clauses. Id. But, this permits judicial scrutiny to begin with
a factual inquiry where government judgment is given deference under the Takings Clause.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413–16. Holmesian analytics create the need for an array
of takings standards of review and an effective list of substantive principles. Why? These
standards and principles determine the extent of the magnitude of economic effects and
scrutinize government judgment within the factual inquiry, or factual analytics, employed
to weigh economic, political and other circumstances. Id. at 415–16. In Holmesian ana-
lytics, these standards and principles exist independently of the factual inquiry. Id. at 413.
This independent existence creates a theoretical-analytical need to determine, fashion,
and justify takings standards of review and principles independent of the factual inquiry.
This theoretical-analytical need is takings doctrine that has been slow to evolve under
factual analytics. It is doctrine that establishes standards and principles to determine the
magnitude of economic effects and to scrutinize government judgment, which possesses
the greater weight in determining a taking and the need for just compensation. See id.
at 413. Takings doctrine establishes standards and principles that create a constitutional
norm and create predictability, though not absolute, in shifting the burdens of the public
to owners of real and personal property. See Brauneis, supra note 93, at 615–17. Justice
Holmes must have foreseen legal doctrine when he concluded that a limit to burden-shifting
regulation exists beyond the Due Process and Contract Clauses, stating, “The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Justice Holmes
recognized then, what is most obvious today, that private property is subject to regulation
by government in many circumstances. Id. at 413. Yet, Justice Holmes went further, limit-
ing regulation by recognizing that exceptional cases may not stand on tradition rather than
principle. Id. at 415–16. He found that it is not readily understood—shifting certainty and
an orderly evolution of regulatory takings theory.
117 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415–16. Justice
Holmes sets forth analytics of regulatory takings theory, questioning whether govern-
ment power shifting the burden of hardships from one individual to another is justifiable
under all or many circumstances. Justice Holmes stated:
In general it is not plain that a man’s misfortunes or necessities will
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor’s shoulders. We are in
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Holmesian analytics applied to examine and judge regulation that provides
benefits to individuals and the public where these benefits may signal an
unconstitutional shift of public burdens to owners of private property by
limiting the utility and economics of private property.118
The logic and structure of Holmesian analytics leave little doubt
regarding the nature of the dominant analytical inquiry, but do not limit
or bound economic or other types of regulatory effects challenged as being
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change.
Id. at 416 (citation omitted).
Holmesian analytics determine if the judgment of government is permitted to transfer
or shift social, economic, and other burdens of social life, public welfare, or economic trans-
actions to groups or individuals, such as landowners. Id.
Holmesian analytics establish the factual inquiry, and recognize that the application
of factual inquiry to the regulatory takings claim is a “question of degree.” Id. This
outcome depends on the extent of the magnitude of the incidental effects on private prop-
erty and scrutiny of the government’s judgment possessing greater weight. Id. at 415–16.
Holmesian analytics guard against the use of bright line tests or “general propositions,”
and recognize that the facts of Pennsylvania Coal were entirely different from earlier
takings decisions caused by the emergency circumstances of World War I, and that these
facts presented an entirely different issue for the Court to decide. Id. Justice Holmes
finds that the takings decisions caused by the war were at the edge of the takings and
just compensation limitations but were permissible because the emergency was tem-
porary and just compensation was provided. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. Justice
Holmes stated:
As we already have said, this is a question of degree—and there-
fore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. But we regard this
as going beyond any of the cases decided by this Court. The late decisions
upon laws dealing with the congestion of Washington and New York,
caused by the war, dealt with laws intended to meet a temporary emer-
gency and providing for compensation determined to be reasonable by
an impartial board. They went to the verge of the law but fell far short
of the present act.
Id. (citation omitted).
Holmesian analytics favor a factual inquiry, abhor general propositions to resolve
takings claims, and see a limit on regulation even for temporary emergencies. Id. at 415–16.
Against a backdrop of Holmesian analytics to execute regulatory takings theory, the Court’s
precedents do not coherently explain theoretical-analytical or doctrinal approaches it has
taken to execute regulatory takings theory. See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes
(discussing the Court’s reliance on common law and constitutional doctrine and prag-
matism to establish standards of review and other principles); see also Brauneis, supra
note 93, at 616–17.
118 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415–16; supra Part I.B and accompanying text
(explaining how Holmesian analytics seek to enforce the limitations imposed by government
seeking to shift more public and individual hardships and misfortunes to landowners and
other groups).
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more than incidental.119 In the preferred analytical inquiry, Holmesian
analytics place great weight on government judgment by relying on the
fact that some circumstances, not including the exceptional cases, may
show a sufficient lack of judgment to undermine the utility, economics,
and other values of property rights where such values are guaranteed
protection but are not protected or secured by the Due Process120 and
Contract121 Clauses of the Constitution.122 Herein lies the need for the
Takings Clause.123 The protection of the right to just compensation, which
protects the value of private property, fosters a doctrinal need to con-
tinue the development and growth of regulatory takings theory.124
Except for a few fruitless and less productive threads of takings
jurisprudence,125 Holmesian analytics are mostly underdeveloped and
patently piecemeal in the development of regulatory takings theory.126 In
fact, this theory rests mostly on an ad hoc, factual inquiry that actually
reduces or undermines the nature and force of regulatory takings theory.127
The Court uses factual inquiries to develop theory, create doctrine, and
resolve claims, thus resting the development of regulatory takings theory
on unique factual patterns or the circumstances of a few communities.128
Therefore, regulatory takings theory has moved only a small jurispru-
dential step from its origin in Pennsylvania Coal.129
119 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
120 U.S. CONST. amends. V, cl. 3 & XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
121 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
122 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (discussing the logic and structure of the
Holmes analytic in weighing incidental effects, creating a factual inquiry, and examining
government judgment).
123 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
124 See Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 282–83 (2006).
125 See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes (discussing the use of problematic consti-
tutional and common law doctrines to create takings standards of review and principles).
126 Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era:
New Solutions for the Regulatory Takings Problem, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST
COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 125, 130–31
(Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992).
127 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (discussing the role and use of the ad hoc
inquiry of Penn Central in applying a deferential standard of review under regulatory
takings theory).
128 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory Takings: Policy Analysis and Democratic Principles,
in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE OF THE
TAKINGS ISSUE 25, 27 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992).
129 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s refusal to expand and
crystalize the holding of Pennsylvania Coal in subsequent cases).
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It is not safe to assume that every American city is similar and
uses the same plans, policies, and regulations.130 A theoretical-analytical
intermediacy between theoretical development and factual analytical
inquiry is missing in regulatory takings jurisprudence.131 Doctrinal bor-
rowing from common law and constitutional doctrine shows the lack of
development of takings doctrine and its analytics.132 Reinserting or reviv-
ing the jurisprudential development of Holmesian analytics to execute
regulatory takings will yield a more stable and predictable theoretical-
analytical doctrine,133 which will coalesce diverging takings standards of
review and principles. In Holmesian analytics, these standards and prin-
ciples determine the extent of the magnitude of economic effects of regu-
lation and scrutinize the limit of government judgment possessing the
greater weight.134
C. Doctrinal or Ad Hoc Thinking to Justify Standards of Review
and New Principles
Explaining away Armstrong’s135 doctrine as illustrative dicta and
relying on Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.136 to eliminate takings dicta cannot
logically follow; the Court straightforwardly applied Armstrong’s fairness
and justice doctrine in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council137 (and perhaps
did so going far beyond any ad hoc inquiry or its prelude, thus examin-
ing, and then eliminating, factual theories). Of course, one application of
130 Compare SAN FRANCISCO PLANNING DEPARTMENT, PLAN ELEMENT: TRANSPORTATION
(PART I) (2009), http://www.sf-planning.org/index.aspx?page=1617(focusing on reducing
traffic to increase sustainability), with BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, URBAN RING
TRANSIT PROJECT (2008), http://www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/planning/Planning
InitsIndividual .asp?action=ViewInit&InitID=2 (focusing on adding a transportation route
to shorten travel times).
131 See supra Part I.A.
132 Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 246–51 (showing the disconnect between the Court’s
decisions and the different sources the Court used to arrive at those decisions).
133 See supra Part II.A–B and accompanying notes (explaining the need for takings doctrine
to execute the regulatory takings theory of Pennsylvania Coal).
134 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining the need for a theoretical-
analytical doctrine of regulatory takings theory that is executed by balancing the different
takings standards of review and principles).
135 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
136 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
137 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2001)
(“Next we shall explain why the Armstrong principle requires rejection of that rule as
well as the less extreme position advanced by petitioners at oral argument.”).
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Armstrong does not create unassailable takings doctrine, but the Court
has used the Armstrong doctrine in numerous cases to validate the
Framers’ purpose and intent of the Takings Clause.138 The Court goes
much further, and perhaps too far to turn back, by using Armstrong
doctrine to eliminate factual theories underlain by the other takings
standards of review and fundamental takings principles.139 This judicial
and constitutional validation gives Armstrong doctrine more takings
credibility and weight to guide the creation of regulatory takings stan-
dards of review and principles.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council uses a uniquely theoretical appli-
cation of the Armstrong doctrine to eliminate factual patterns containing
138 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.; see, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 302; Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
835 n.4 (1987).
The dissent has also relied on Armstrong to show that the Court’s majority opinion
did not necessarily foster the fairness and justice of the Takings and Public Use Clauses,
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Kelo, Justice O’Connor, writing for one of the dissents, stated:
While the Takings Clause presupposes that government can take
private property without the owner’s consent, the just compensation
requirement spreads the cost of condemnations and thus “prevents the
public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the
burdens of government.” The public use requirement, in turn, imposes
a more basic limitation, circumscribing the very scope of the eminent
domain power: Government may compel an individual to forfeit her prop-
erty for the public’s use, but not for the benefit of another private person.
This requirement promotes fairness as well as security.
Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, in Lucas, Justice Blackmun, writing for one dissent, addressed the conflict
that arises when the Court creates heightened scrutiny under the Takings Clause:
Viewed more broadly, the Court’s new rule and exception conflict
with the very character of our takings jurisprudence. . . . This is unavoid-
able, for the determination whether a law effects a taking is ultimately
a matter of “fairness and justice,” and “necessarily requires a weighing
of private and public interests,” The rigid rules fixed by the Court today
clash with this enterprise: “fairness and justice” are often disserved by
categorical rules.
. . . .
The Just Compensation Clause “was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
139 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 302, 336–37 (explaining that a per se rule
based on a specific set of facts would not be supported by the Armstrong doctrine).
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different takings standards of review and principles.140 This application
directly implicates both the constitutional equity and the judicial process
of the Federal Judiciary’s scrutiny of government regulatory actions, and
by extension, the outcomes of regulatory takings disputes undertaken to
protect property rights under the Takings Clause.141 Specifically, this ap-
plication weighs whether government responses are proportionate to the
private actions and circumstances justifying the redistribution of public
burdens to further the legislature’s community objectives.142 The least
doctrinal significance of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council must be recog-
nized as embryonic takings doctrine that could potentially coalesce and
conjoin a morass of takings laws and issues.143
Of course, the Court may continue to haphazardly establish stan-
dards of review and takings principles under an ad hoc approach. This
approach is best suited to judge factual circumstances concerning con-
stitutional equity and judicial process through the application of takings
standards of review and principles.144 The Court creates a dual use of the
Penn Central145 inquiry when it uses the inquiry as an ad hoc factual in-
quiry to apply takings principles, and as doctrine to justify takings stan-
dards and principles resting mostly on evolving regulation and changing
factual patterns.146 Although any factual, ad hoc approach may rest on
Pennsylvania Coal’s147 takings theory, it critically contains too little theory
and analytics (theoretical-analytical capacity) at its core to serve as tak-
ings doctrine.148 This factual ad hoc approach lacks a stable framework
capable of connecting regulation to its impact on the fundamental right
140 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 336–37.
141 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.; see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 336–37 (“The
concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ . . . are less than fully determinate.”); see also Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1027 (finding no fairness or equity where the government, in a disproportionate
response, takes all beneficial use of land and lacks a valid state purpose to justify the
taking); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (finding no justice or process when the government limits
a fundamentally important right and offers a benefit of “little or no relationship”).
142 Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 253.
143 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 336–37.
144 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (using ad
hoc, factual inquiries to determine what important factors were at play).
145 Id.
146 Compare supra Part I.B and accompanying notes, with supra note 112 and accom-
panying text.
147 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1923).
148 See infra note 214 and accompanying text (showing one of the limitations of the factual,
ad hoc inquiry).
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of just compensation.149 This connection is what justifies the standards of
review and principles that protect that right.150 There is little to no evidence
of a theoretical-analytical model of constitutional doctrine in the line of the
Court’s takings decisions.151 How? These decisions frequently undermine
one another in order to protect the right to just compensation.152 They con-
sist mostly of a piecemeal approach to evaluating legislative judgment and
weighing the economic effects of takings disputes.153 Therefore, the Court
has not shown enough constitutional equity and judicial process to estab-
lish a proportionate redistribution of public burdens by limiting numerous
government policies threatening to circumvent or undermine the right
to just compensation.
Economic interests, constitutional limitations, public policy
concerns, and governmental policymaking needs must be analyzed and
weighed in determining, justifying, and fashioning a full range of stan-
dards of review and other principles under the Takings Clause.154 Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council and Palazzolo show that Armstrong contains
basic constitutional doctrine that can be applied or used to determine,
justify, and fashion standards of review and other takings principles.155
Equally important, this doctrine should not disturb or undermine exist-
ing standards built on sound constitutional reasoning. These standards
and other principles include fundamental justice and fairness, which
would not undermine but broaden the equity, process, and outcomes of the
factual, ad hoc approach of Penn Central.156 An emerging doctrine must not
undermine soundly reasoned precedents protecting the fundamental
149 Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 250–51.
150 Id. (finding that the lack of a stable framework can allow a heavy public burden to be
placed on individuals).
151 See supra Part I.A.
152 Compare Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–32 (1992) (concluding
that a regulation denied all economically viable use and thus did not allow personal use to
rise to the level of the landowner’s preexisting potential for economic use), with Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (concluding that an upland tract in the middle
of the wetlands tract permitted economic use, even if only a personal dwelling, and thus
there was not a denial of all economically viable use).
153 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (illustrating the clearly diverging lines of
cases under the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.).
154 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see infra note 225 and accompanying text.
155 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2001);
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see infra
Part IV.A.
156 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
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constitutional right to receive just compensation.157 Instead, the doctrine
must give this right greater constitutional validity by protecting and fur-
thering the social welfare, political, and economic interests underlying
government regulation and its objectives.158
III. TAKINGS DOCTRINE TO JUSTIFY AND FASHION STANDARDS OF
REVIEW AND OTHER PRINCIPLES
In protecting the Constitution and its rights, powers, and limita-
tions, the Armstrong doctrine must address the needs, manner, and range
of the full set of standards of review and takings principles necessary to
scrutinize and judge the plethora of takings claims arising under the
Takings Clause.159 In the nature of Pennsylvania Coal and its creation of
regulatory takings theory, the Armstrong doctrine’s genesis is unique to
the Takings Clause and the protection of private property in a constitu-
tional democracy because it bestows powers and imposes limitations on
government policymaking and regulation.160 The Armstrong doctrine goes
to the heart of the Takings Clause and fulfills its purpose and intent by
protecting the right to just compensation, including its abuse and misuse
by government, as a means to protect property rights beyond the limits
of the Due Process and Contract Clauses.161 In light of both Penn Central
and Pennsylvania Coal and their predilection for giving greater weight and
traditional deference to government judgment,162 the Armstrong doctrine
still seeks to capture and weigh the public utility, economic impact, and
personal worth of property rights against government policymaking that
imposes new public obligations and creates new public benefits by redis-
tributing public burdens in an emerging, competitive global economy and
changing natural environment.163 In reflecting on Lucas164 and giving
weight to the economics of private property, the Armstrong doctrine seeks
157 See supra Part I.C.
158 See infra Part III.B.
159 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see infra Part IV.B (discussing the Court’s use of the
Armstrong doctrine in seven different factual examples in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council).
160 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see supra Part I.C.
161 See infra Part III.C.
162 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1923); see supra note 16 and Part I.C (discussing the foundation
of Penn Central and Pennsylvania Coal as deferential to the government, as compared
to Armstrong’s foundation’s focus on fairness and justice).
163 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see infra Part III.B.
164 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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to accord economic use, value, expectations, and other values of private
property proportionate weight in justifying and fashioning standards of
review to protect the right to just compensation.165 Yet, in a proportionate
balance of shifting public and private burdens, the Holmesian value of pri-
vate property can never be the sole or determinative factor in deferential
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or any other takings propo-
sition applied to scrutinize government regulation and its objectives.166
As for constitutional limitations and property interests other than eco-
nomic value, the right of the Takings Clause is the right to receive just
compensation,167 and its purpose is to protect private property against
unjust regulation and condemnation beyond the limits of the Due Process
and Contract Clauses.168
A. Nature of Takings Limitations, Property Rights, and Their Uses
Federal constitutional rights-based arguments best protect prop-
erty rights when they invoke and protect the stature of the right to just
compensation in takings disputes, thus directly involving broader Fifth
Amendment limitations.169 Takings and public use provisions are limi-
tations on the exercise of government powers, and successful claims chal-
lenging takings and public use result in a remedy, either equitable or
compensatory. When government takes property by regulation and con-
demnation, government directly triggers the right to just compensation,
which is a right conditional on taking for public use.170
Protecting the right to just compensation protects property rights
by forcing government to weigh the costs of redistributing public burdens
against gaining uncompensated benefits via government condemnation,
regulation, contract, and other actions that are likely to take private prop-
erty but which do not do so for a public use. The Court is not silent here.
Dolan, Lucas, and Nollan protect the right to receive just compensation
as an important constitutional right, and protect private property rights
165 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49; see infra Part III.B.
166 There must also be some consideration of the public interest that is involved. See
Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council and Justice Scalia’s Primer on Property
Rights: Advancing New Democratic Traditions by Defending the Tradition of Property,
24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 179 (2000).
167 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
168 See infra Part III.A.
169 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (recognizing that two lines of takings cases
exist, whereas one line has had successful arguments).
170 U.S. CONST. amend V, cl. 4.
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by imposing heightened scrutiny.171 Setting forth this Fifth Amendment
protection, the Court made it abundantly clear that takings standards of
review must rest on doctrine, either constitutional or common law, to
protect the right to just compensation.172 In the aftermath of Dolan,173 a
few takings claims have sought greater protection for property rights and
may not have fully implicated the need to protect the right to just com-
pensation.174 Obviously, a doctrinal approach would not be foreign to the
Court in justifying, establishing, and fashioning standards of review and
principles to protect private property rights by giving greater force to the
right to receive just compensation of the Fifth Amendment.175 The doc-
trinal approach recognizes that the right to receive just compensation,
after Dolan,176 may be slowly but surely returning to this lowly stature
in the mix of fundamental and important rights.
Property rights are not fundamental constitutional rights, but are
so ubiquitous that creating unbridled per se and heightened scrutiny tests
threaten to decimate the takings, public use, and just compensation limi-
tations of the Fifth Amendment.177 Moreover, these loose or unstructured
per se claims could easily threaten to paralyze the making of equitable and
sustainable land use, economic development, and other policies under
police and other powers, as almost everything is virtually private prop-
erty and endowed with the same inalienable property rights. Property
rights protect both real and personal property in the common law legal
system. Their societal ubiquity does not mean that government is free to
work its will by judicial logic, political rationality, or bureaucratic force.
If government can take at will, the limitations of the Takings Clause are
171 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
172 See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes (discussing the use of common law and
constitutional doctrine in justifying takings standards of review to protect property rights).
173 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
174 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (refusing to apply heightened
scrutiny or an intermediate standard of review to judge a rent control statute imposed on
commercial property); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny or per se test to
judge, if not eliminate, many moratoria or interim development controls on land use).
175 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389 (applying the rough proportionality test as heightened scru-
tiny under established constitutional doctrine); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026–27
(applying a categorical per se test as heightened scrutiny under common law doctrine);
see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (applying an essential nexus test as heightened scrutiny
in the shadows of established constitutional doctrine).
176 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389.
177 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
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worthless to limit public use, contain takings, and ensure just compensa-
tion. In this regard, common law doctrine does not go far enough. Inversely,
this looks as though giving protection, credence, or stature to private prop-
erty rights protects the right to just compensation. If so, this would imply
strongly a Property Rights Clause in the Constitution but would under-
mine the guarantees of the Due Process and Contract Clauses.178 There-
fore, constitutional doctrine is necessary to determine, justify, and fashion
takings standards of review and principles for the use of heightened scru-
tiny, or for a per se test to protect what the Framers enumerated in the
Constitution to protect property rights, and not what common law courts
reasoned to protect feudal estates of real and personal property. The right
to just compensation protects property rights under the Constitution, even
though the right to just compensation exists solely as a means to further
the interests of private property.
B. Need to Find and Establish Middle Ground in the
Redistribution of Public Burdens
The provision of fairness and justice under the Takings Clause179
goes far to support an underlying theoretical-analytical doctrine to justify
standards of review and underpin takings principles. This doctrine can
justify and reaffirm deferential, intermediate, or heightened scrutiny to
protect the right to just compensation in securing or guaranteeing equi-
table legislative judgment and policymaking and permitting appropriate
scrutiny and weighing of this judgment and policymaking by federal and
state courts. In Armstrong, the Court held that the termination of a gov-
ernment contract by breach or default of a private contractor would not
cut off materialmen’s liens that attached to the delivery of construction
materials during the performance of the contract for the United States
Navy.180 The Court concluded that materialmen’s liens that attached to
construction materials were property under Maine law with compensable
value.181 The contractual rights of the United States that compelled transfer
of the partially completed boats and unused materials to the United States
did not terminate these liens, even though these liens could not be enforced
against the United States.182 The lack of enforceability of the liens was a
178 But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30.
179 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
180 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.
181 Id. at 46.
182 Id. at 46–47.
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destruction of the liens,183 and this destruction was a taking of private prop-
erty for public use.184 The Court noted that the means of taking by con-
tract did not “reliev[e] the Government from its constitutional obligation
to pay just compensation for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and
of which loss the Government was the direct, positive beneficiary.”185
Evidence of Armstrong’s foothold toward greater doctrinal substance
to justify standards of review is found in Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Palazzolo,186 but the advantage favored redistributing the bur-
den borne by government policymaking to landowners by giving too much
weight to past and present circumstances.187 Quintessentially, Armstrong’s
foothold toward greater doctrinal significance is Justice Stevens’s majority
opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, where Justice Stevens re-
lied in part on Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo to sup-
port a deferential review.188 But, again the advantage favored government
183 See id.
184 Id. at 48. In Armstrong, Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated:
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens,
which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of
a Fifth Amendment “taking” and is not a mere “consequential incidence”
of a valid regulatory measure. Before the liens were destroyed, the
lienholders admittedly had compensable property. Immediately after-
wards, they had none. This was not because their property vanished
into thin air.
Id.
185 Id. at 49.
186 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
187 Id.
188 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334–35
(2002). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated:
More importantly, for reasons set out at some length by Justice
O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S.,[sic] at 636, we are persuaded that the better approach to claims that
a regulation has effected a temporary taking “requires careful examina-
tion and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” . . . Her comments
on the “fairness and justice” inquiry are, nevertheless, instructive:
“Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s
enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn
Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this
consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it
exclusive significance. Our polestar instead remains the principles set
forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial
regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with investment-
backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must
examine. . . .
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policymaking facing future land use changes and relying on well-estab-
lished land use policies.189 Yet, the analytics and logic of Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council and Palazzolo, which demand Armstrong justice
and fairness but show no doctrinal calculus to determine, justify, and
fashion a standard of review to weigh public burdens and regulatory
circumstances, most often raise one or more questions regarding propor-
tionality in the redistribution of public burdens and benefits.190
In fundamental fairness and justice, the Armstrong doctrine must
play a role in establishing standards of review. These standards weigh and
measure whether the redistribution of public burdens and creation of
benefits under government regulation are proportional to restrictions
and limitations imposed on exercises of property rights in furthering
public needs, notwithstanding reciprocity of advantages to the community
“The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. We have recognized that this
constitutional guarantee is ‘ “designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” ’ Penn Central, [438
U.S.],[sic] at 123–24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960). The concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ that underlie the
Takings Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate.”
Id. at 335–36.
Notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s reliance on the Penn Central inquiry, the thrust
of our argument is that the indeterminate nature of Armstrong doctrine can only develop
in takings jurisprudence when justice and fairness are treated as constitutional doctrine to
justify, fashion, and establish a coherent body of takings standards of review and principles.
189 Id. at 334–35. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated:
With respect to these theories, the ultimate constitutional question
is whether the concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the
Takings Clause will be better served by one of these categorical rules
or by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in
particular cases. From that perspective, the extreme categorical rule
that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, consti-
tutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained. . . . A rule that
required compensation for every delay in the use of property would
render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encour-
age hasty decisionmaking. Such an important change in the law should
be the product of legislative rulemaking rather than adjudication.
Id.
Justice Stevens’s questions could be interpreted as asking whether the “fairness and
justice” doctrine of Armstrong protects the right to just compensation as the only consti-
tutional alternative remaining to protect private property rights from interim develop-
ment controls that exist for a combined duration of thirty-two months.
190 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 334–35; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606; see
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40.
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as a whole. The ultimate need for the Armstrong doctrine in establishing
standards of review and other takings principles is to protect the right
to just compensation. Specifically, this need includes determining, justify-
ing, and fashioning deferential, intermediate, and heightened scrutiny
to find if the appropriate kind of proportionality exists in the distribution
or redistribution of public burdens between property owners and govern-
ment. Doctrinally, the Armstrong doctrine would determine the relevance,
connection, or germaneness between the right to just compensation and
government regulation in establishing more proportionate standards of
review to weigh and measure the redistribution of public burdens.
Our emphasis on the right to just compensation is the complete or
total reliance on the Framers’ intent for the utility and capacity of federal
constitutional limitations and rights, such as public use and just compen-
sation, to protect property rights.191 Unequivocally, bare or naked property
rights do not protect private property in constitutional rights-limitations
regimes between property owners and governments, who are neither com-
mon law trespassers nor judges but legislative policymakers.192 Many of
the public use, just compensation, and takings claims discussed supra
appear to use or rely on the economic force and democratic nature of
American property rights to justify the protection of private property.193
However, the ubiquitous nature and importance of property rights under
the Constitution counter this argument. The argument is circuitous, thus
leaving attorneys to argue that property rights are valuable so they should
be protected, when they also acknowledge or admit that just about every-
thing is or could be property. So, do we give all property rights paramount
protection under the Constitution, thus making capital (land) more impor-
tant than books (knowledge)? Obviously not!
C. Looking within the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for
Constitutional Doctrine
The Armstrong doctrine gives real estate, land use, corporate, and
other attorneys a way to protect property rights by advocating for greater
protection of a federal constitutional right.194 Armstrong’s doctrinal
approach is the use of constitutional doctrine to argue for protection of
a constitutional right and limitation. This protection of a constitutional
191 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785–97 (1995).
192 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
193 See id.; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 302; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606.
194 Jan C. Laitos, Takings and Causation, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 359, 362 (1997).
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right secures the guarantees that protect private interests, such as pri-
vate property rights.195 Of course, government officials, policymakers,
and their attorneys would benefit from the Armstrong doctrine’s develop-
ment of more stable standards of review and takings principles.196 This
argument uses what the Framers enumerated in the Constitution to
grow, refine, and finally establish a body of constitutional doctrine to
underlie and underpin the associated constitutional rights, and not
forsake those rights that are difficult to apply in their development.197
The impact of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council198 and Palazzolo199
on takings jurisprudence in the Rehnquist Court goes far to eliminate the
confusion surrounding the three-prong analytical inquiry of Penn Central.200
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the majority bestows on Armstrong
greater constitutional purpose by using it to eliminate factual theories
of regulatory takings disputes.201 Even earlier, in a concurring opinion of
Palazzolo, Justice O’Connor relied on Armstrong to justify greater weight
for circumstances justifying or supporting burdensome government regu-
lation.202 Now, the Armstrong doctrine includes an examination of justice
and fairness in the application of takings principles and touches upon the
diminution of value and other principles underlying the three factors of
the Penn Central203 inquiry.204 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the
Court went further than it did in Palazzolo and actually applied Armstrong
doctrine to factual theories representing or illustrating various types of
regulatory takings disputes.205
The jurisprudential question is whether the Armstrong fairness
and justice doctrine broadly supports or shows enough basic fairness and
justice in the aftermath of Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council to provide equity and process in judging takings claims.206
195 Id. at 362.
196 For example, “Dolan provided constitutional justifications for a higher standard of
review for burdensome constitutional demands.” Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 285.
197 Laitos, supra note 194, at 362.
198 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
199 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
200 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
201 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 326.
202 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
203 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138.
204 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 333–34.
205 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 333–34; see infra Part IV.B and accom-
panying notes (discussing the use of Armstrong by Justices O’Connor and Stevens to
support the application of a factual inquiry in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council).
206 See Holloway and Guy, supra note 1, at 237–38.
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Armstrong doctrine must be constitutionally robust enough to support
the takings theory and principles of Pennsylvania Coal207 and fertile
enough to birth new standards and takings principles under the Penn
Central208 inquiry. The outcome of this question means that any takings
standards and principles that flow from Armstrong’s application are a
part of takings jurisprudence for an analytically decisive scrutiny of gov-
ernment means and ends, an analytically active economic effects analysis
of economic impacts and financial expectations, and an analytically sen-
sitive approach for determining just compensation. These standards and
principles result in a burden on landowners under the Takings Clause.209
First, analytically decisive scrutiny determines whether the means, pur-
poses, and objectives of government responses are proportionate and thus
valid to further community interests.210 Secondly, an analytically sensitive
economic effects analysis determines, weighs, or considers basic economic
theories and principles germane to determining whether land owners,
developers, and others are enduring or bearing a disproportionately
heavy private burden, namely the temporary loss of use, severe restric-
tions on use, or other economic effects.211 Third, an analytically sensitive
approach to just compensation determines damages and equity by weigh-
ing land values and long standing communal and personal relationships
and capturing the loss of community, aesthetics, place, and purpose in the
creation of valuable public-private benefits.212 In sum, the ad hoc or prag-
matic approach places much weight on land or real estate values under
judicially crafted principles of ill defined markets213 and often overlooks
economic circumstances that should be weighed by courts to understand
basic real estate, economic, and business thinking.214
207 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1923).
208 Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
209 U.S. CONT. amend. V, cl. 4; see Holloway and Guy, supra note 1, at 264.
210 See Holloway and Guy, supra note 1, at 278 n.242.
211 See id. at 236–37.
212 But cf. Lopez, supra note 124, at 278–82 (discussing the longstanding tradition of
using market value to determine damages).
213 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). Justice Kennedy, writing for
a majority that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and
Thomas, permitted land value to mitigate a denial of economically viable use. Id. at 630.
Justice O’Connor listed circumstances that should be weighed in determining land value
in a claim involving an interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id.
at 632–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that market circumstances
should be given the greater weight. Id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
214 For an example of a more market-sensitive evaluation, see Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Cienega, Congress passed acts restricting the
pre-payment options of the mortgages of low-income housing development owners, allegedly
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IV. EQUITY AND PROCESS SCRUTINY OF THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH
TO FIT REGULATION TO CIRCUMSTANCES
This part discusses the use of the Armstrong fairness and justice
doctrine by the Court under a pragmatic approach and shows the doc-
trine’s capacity to address both economic and social needs and concerns
of community policymaking. This part also discusses the need for a doc-
trinal constitutional underpinning for standards of review, including an
ad hoc approach, running through Takings Clause jurisprudence.
A. Armstrong Fairness and Justice Doctrine to Create Equity and
Judicial Process in Reviewing Regulation
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Court applied the
Armstrong doctrine to determine if the facts fit one or more factual theories
illustrating various types of regulatory takings disputes.215 Of course, one
Court decision may not create doctrine, but the intrigue of examining a
Court-established precept that holds any potential of coalescing inconsis-
tent precedents, confusing principles, and various standards of review of
regulatory takings theory is too great to forsake. The Armstrong doctrine
determines whether the public burden shared by government and land-
owners is proportionate under government regulatory and policy con-
straints and landowners’ economic and social burdens.216 The public
burdens borne by property owners include the acceptance of obligations,
hardships, and other incidents unique to their class, but these burdens
causing harm by prohibiting certain uses of the property. Id. at 1323–24. The Federal
Circuit held that the “[o]wners’ loss of the contractual prepayment rights was both total
and immediate. They were barred from the unregulated rental market and other more
lucrative property uses.” Id. at 1344. In the related case of City Line Joint Venture v.
United States, 503 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the Federal Circuit preferred to hear similar
claims based on contract theory instead of as a takings claim, noting that the claimant
had contracted with the government and that “a finding of privity of contract is to find
a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 1322. The court declined to hear takings arguments
until the breach of contract claim had been determined. Id. at 1323; see also Phillip Morris,
Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that, where a state law required tobacco
companies to disclose their ingredient lists, the companies had reasonable investment-
backed interests in their ingredients lists as trade secrets, and forced disclosure would
effect a taking); Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 240 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that a similar contractual issue between the federal government and a property owner
involved a property interest and raised a takings issue), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S.
129 (2002).
215 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
216 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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could be borne by the public under different obligations or compensation
or both.217 The public must share or retain a proportionate burden under
the Armstrong doctrine, thus not externalizing constraints on fiscal and
other resources.218
Although Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council gives insight into
creating new takings doctrine by applying a takings precept to the broad-
est of factual patterns and substantive principles,219 this application of
the Armstrong doctrine by the Court could lead to an imbalance in the
development of takings standards of review. This imbalanced develop-
ment could favor deferential scrutiny and include the less heightened
scrutiny of means, the still lesser scrutiny of ends analysis, and the least
stringent scrutiny of economic effect analysis.220 In Palazzolo, Justice
O’Connor used the Armstrong doctrine to justify the impact of past regu-
latory circumstances on an issue of takings liability.221 In implicating an
economic effects analysis, Justice O’Connor looked back at past circum-
stances in reasoning that the Penn Central222 inquiry should weigh past
regulatory schemes in determining liability and compensation for some
takings claims.223 Obviously, real estate, financial, and economic princi-
ples, such as risk-return and market expectations, normally would not
support totally denying or restricting any returns on investments held for
decades by giving the original book value.224 Following Justice O’Connor’s
line of reasoning, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council applied
Armstrong doctrine to examine the economic, regulatory, and policy cir-
cumstances and factual takings theories.225 In finding an inconsequential
temporary burden, the Court saw no long-lasting economic impact.226 Yet,
217 See Laitos, supra note 194, at 363.
218 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40.
219 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 307–12, for a discussion of the facts.
220 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 246.
221 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
222 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
223 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–36.
224 Justice O’Connor specifically noted such investment-backed expectations in her con-
currence in Palazzolo. Id. at 633–34.
225 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002).
226 Id. at 341. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, stated:
Moreover, with a temporary ban on development there is a lesser risk
that individual landowners will be “singled out” to bear a special burden
that should be shared by the public as a whole. At least with a mora-
torium there is a clear “reciprocity of advantage,” because it protects
the interests of all affected landowners against immediate construction
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some land use restrictions might become permanent, and would redis-
tribute hardships and transfer benefits as increases in land value and
aesthetics to other landowners.227 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council used
the Armstrong doctrine to determine if Lucas’s228 per se approach should
be applied to interim development controls or moratoria.229 In avoiding
the reliance on doctrine, the Court’s pragmatic approach included too
little judicial process and not enough outcome equity in determining if
moratoria or interim development controls were proportionate responses
to the public burdens and restrictions on property rights of landowners.
B. Armstrong Fairness and Justice of the Per Se Approach in a
Pragmatic Context
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Court applied Armstrong
doctrine to seven factual theories to determine whether the doctrine sup-
ported finding a temporary regulatory taking in a temporary ban on the
development of the land.230 The Court identified those theories that could
be applied to determine whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s
(“TRPA”) moratoria could be a regulatory taking under a set of factual
theories squarely grounded in a complete set of takings standards of review
and other important takings principles.231 The underlying analytics of an
illustrative application cannot be contained in fitting this set of factual
theories to one regulatory taking. This seismic application is plainly more
than the mere application of law to facts; nor is it simply the application of
dicta. Many standards of review and other takings principles underpinning
that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is ulti-
mately adopted. “While each of us is burdened somewhat by such
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are
placed on others.” In fact, there is reason to believe property values often
will continue to increase despite a moratorium. . . . Such an increase
makes sense in this context because property values throughout the
Basin can be expected to reflect the added assurance that Lake Tahoe
will remain in its pristine state. Since in some cases a 1-year moratorium
may not impose a burden at all, we should not adopt a rule that assumes
moratoria always force individuals to bear a special burden that should
be shared by the public as a whole.
Id. (citation omitted).
227 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 291 (briefly explaining other economic and aes-
thetic benefits of the moratoria on surrounding land values and the community).
228 Lucas v. S.C. Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
229 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 333.
230 Id. at 333–34.
231 Id.
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these factual theories do not show much success in challenging govern-
ment responses to private actions, such as real estate development. These
standards and principles also do not indicate viable takings or substantive
doctrine—presently resting on less viable constitutional and common law
thinking232—to determine and justify narrow, weak, or inchoate standards
of review and principles.
The Court’s seven factual theories show the ad hoc nature of devel-
oping regulatory takings theory in search of deferential or bright-line tests,
rather than sound takings doctrine to determine, justify, and fashion stan-
dards and other principles capable of determining proportionate govern-
ment responses in light of the right to just compensation.233 The Court’s
seven theories include the following: (1) a categorical or per se regulatory
taking, (2) a temporary taking, (3) a short delay of less than five years
causing a taking, (4) a rolling moratoria causing a taking, (5) a longer
delay of more than five years causing a taking, (6) challenging a regu-
lation before its application in a facial takings challenge, and (7) challeng-
ing a regulation after its application as an as-applied taking.234 The seven
factual theories include different regulations that are subjected to different
takings standards of review235 to accord protection to the right to just com-
pensation, which, in turn, protects property rights. The Court has found
only one per se or categorical taking236 and a burdensome, but usually long,
delay of more than five years to be regulatory taking.237 Both theories
included government responses that imposed extreme public burden and
economic impact, but the Court applied entirely different standards of
review in both takings claims.238
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Lucas, or per se taking,
was the standard of review and narrow takings claim that landowners were
requesting the Court to apply, on the theory that these landowners suf-
fered a per se takings in that all economically viable use had been denied
232 See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes (discussing the more modern unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine and the antiquated common law prohibitions, where both have
shown little sustainable success in protecting private property rights from regulatory
restrictions); see also Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 264–68 (discussing the factual
theories that the Court set forth in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council).
233 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 322 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
234 See id. at 333–34.
235 Id. at 334–42.
236 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
237 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999).
238 Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, with Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 698.
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for a duration of three years.239 The first and second theories discussed
by the Court involved Lucas240 and First English,241 demonstrating a strict
standard and takings principles, respectively.242 The property owners had
coupled the concept of Lucas per se takings, which is only applied to tak-
ings claims involving a denial of all economically viable use,243 with First
English’s temporary taking theory244 to create a claim for a temporary
per se taking.245 Lucas was a per se taking that was a total denial of all
beneficial or economically viable use.246 First English concluded that a
landowner can receive just compensation as a remedy for a temporary tak-
ing by regulation;247 it did not conclude that a temporary taking existed
on the facts before it and thus included no findings of a temporary taking
under any standard of review. In the end, the suggestion of a temporary
per se taking was not successful in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council.248
Lucas represents a per se or categorical standard of review that deter-
mines the existence of takings only where a regulation denies all econom-
ically viable use.249 First English is simply a type of taking based on the
duration of the government’s response and depends on other standards
of review to determine the exact takings that the duration would create.250
239 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 306.
240 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
241 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
242 Lucas concerned the extraordinary situation of a regulation permanently ending all
productive use of a piece of property, and First English considered the question of the
appropriateness of a takings remedy to compensate a temporary taking.
243 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
244 First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
245 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 341–42.
246 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
247 See First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
248 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 341–42.
249 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
250 First English, 482 U.S. at 321. Specifically, in First English, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, stated:
We merely hold that where the government’s activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the
period during which the taking was effective.
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint which we
treat as true for purposes of our decision was that the ordinance in
question denied appellant all use of its property. We limit our holding
to the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the quite different
questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining
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The Lucas and First English theories were eliminated by the Court in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council when the Court rejected a temporary
per se taking of private property for the duration of the moratoria.251
The third and fourth takings theories examined by the Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council Court involved a takings claim that had been
decided by a deferential standard of review,252 and would not have sur-
vived constitutional muster under the Court’s application of Armstrong
doctrine.253 An extreme example of a Del Monte Dunes-type takings claim
would be a short but burdensome delay in approving development per-
mits,254 when the results of the delay are similar to the five-year duration
of the delay in Del Monte Dunes.255 Federal or state courts would have more
likely applied a deferential standard of review and a weakened economic
effects analysis under the deferential Penn Central inquiry.256 Next, in the
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like
which are not before us.
Id.
251 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 332. The Court stated:
Neither Lucas, nor First English, nor any of our other regulatory
takings cases compels us to accept petitioners’ categorical submission.
In fact, these cases make clear that the categorical rule in Lucas was
carved out for the “extraordinary case” in which a regulation perma-
nently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in
the regulatory taking context, we require a more fact specific inquiry.
Id.
252 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702–03
(1999) (rejecting the heightened scrutiny established in Dolan to review land dedication
conditions).
253 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 332–33 & n.27.
254 See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721–22. In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, stated:
Our decision is also circumscribed in its conceptual reach. The posture
of the case does not present an appropriate occasion to define with pre-
cision the elements of a temporary regulatory takings claim; although
the city objected to submitting issues of liability to the jury at all, it
approved the instructions that were submitted to the jury and therefore
has no basis to challenge them.
. . . .
Rather, to the extent Del Monte Dunes’ challenge was premised on
unreasonable governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the
jury was that the city’s denial of the final development permit was
inconsistent not only with the city’s general ordinances and policies but
even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city.
Id.
255 Id. at 698 (finding a duration of approximately five years).
256 See id. at 754 (finding that while the submission of narrow questions of fact to the jury
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longer Del Monte Dunes claim, the heightened scrutiny was rejected and
a deferential Penn Central inquiry was applied to an as-applied takings
claim,257 but the Court found a regulatory takings only after the govern-
ment response resulted in an extraordinary five-year delay in developing
the land.258 In fact, the landowner eventually sold the property to the state
during the pendency of the litigation.259 Any as-applied takings challenge
to these moratoria would not have been successful with such a limited
economic impact.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh theories enumerated in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council include takings standards and other principles.260
Agins was a facial challenge, which is not always successful.261 Facial tak-
ings claims have an inherently heavy burden to overcome in proving the
existence of regulatory takings on the faces of ordinances or statutes.262
They are not always successful in their uphill battle against a government
regulation that has not yet been applied to an actual site.263 Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council was a facial challenge and suffered the same fate as
Agins.264 Next, the Court looked at Penn Central as an as-applied challenge
is appropriate, with respect to whether a body has acted in accordance with its own ordi-
nances, the question is better put to a judge as a matter of law).
257 Id. at 702–03.
258 Id. at 698. In Del Monte Dunes, the Court stated:
In short, the question submitted to the jury on this issue was con-
fined to whether, in light of all the history and the context of the case,
the city’s particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes’ final develop-
ment proposal was reasonably related to the city’s proffered justifi-
cations. This question was couched, moreover, in an instruction that
had been proposed in essence by the city, and as to which the city made
no objection.
Thus, despite the protests of the city and its amici, it is clear that
the Court of Appeals did not adopt a rule of takings law allowing whole-
sale interference by judge or jury with municipal land-use policies, laws,
or routine regulatory decisions. To the extent the city argues that, as a
matter of law, its land-use decisions are immune from judicial scrutiny
under all circumstances, its position is contrary to settled regulatory
takings principles. We reject this claim of error.
Id. at 706–07.
259 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 701–02.
260 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 333–34 (2002).
261 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
262 See id. at 262 (holding that to have a successful facial challenge, litigants must prove
that the regulations either “prevent the best use of [their] land” or “extinguish a funda-
mental attribute of ownership”).
263 See id. at 260.
264 See id.; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 302.
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that was not a successful takings claim under the Takings Clause.265 The
application of Penn Central has often accorded much deference to govern-
ment and found insufficient economic hardships or other effects in assess-
ing the public burdens borne by landowners under regulatory takings
claims.266 Finally, the use of rolling moratoria to limit development in a
community would most likely not survive the deferential scrutiny of the
Penn Central267 inquiry or its application to the extraordinarily long
delay of Del Monte Dunes with its weak consideration of economic im-
pact, value, and expectations.268 In sum, the Court rarely finds a regula-
tory taking under the Penn Central269 deferential inquiry in light of the
Agins uphill facial challenge,270 and Del Monte Dunes exceptionally long
delay.271 The Court subjects these claims to deferential scrutiny and
weak economic effect analysis to review government regulation, namely
ordinances and statutes.272
One must ask whether the facial and as-applied takings claims
fully addressed the redistribution of public burdens challenged under the
various factual theories of regulatory takings. We doubt so. The doctrinal
role of Armstrong is patently obvious in light of the genesis of regulatory
takings doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal.273 Why? The Court has proffered
little or no inherent takings doctrine that would justify the appropriate
level of scrutiny applied in deferential and narrow takings standards of re-
view under the Takings Clause. In addition, the Court has proffered mostly
a Penn Central274 inquiry and no other underlying takings doctrine that
would justify piecemeal takings principles or their applications to analyze
and weigh regulatory, policy, and economic circumstances and constraints
accompanying various government responses.275
265 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
266 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 234.
267 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 135–37 (declaring Penn Central’s Takings claim
unsuccessful on the economic impact and investment-backed expectations issues).
268 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 717–18
(1999) (illustrating a successful takings claim, but only a recovery of money damages to
compensate for an unconstitutional denial of just compensation).
269 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104.
270 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
271 See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 687; see Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 234.
272 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 238.
273 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
274 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104.
275 See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 687; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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C. Too Much Reliance on Deference and Single Circumstance to
Justify Proportionality
These theories and disputes are underlain by, if not illustrative of,
the complete range of standards of review and several takings principles
of the Takings Clause. These theories are underlain by legislative defer-
ence,276 problematic constitutional doctrine,277 and overused common law
doctrine.278 This particular application of the Armstrong doctrine ana-
lyzed dissimilar underlying analytical frameworks of these factual
theories and sought some abstruse connection to fit to the facts at hand in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. Here, the use of the Armstrong
doctrine came close to employing a jurisprudential analysis akin to the
Lucas and Dolan analytics.279 The Court’s analysis failed when it relied too
276 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124–25 (applying a deferential standard
to determine if regulation has gone too far). In Penn Central, the Court found that:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s
decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the
character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law,” and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide
variety of contexts, that government may execute laws or programs that
adversely affect recognized economic values. Exercises of the taxing power
are one obvious example. A second are the decisions in which this Court
has dismissed “taking” challenges on the ground that, while the chal-
lenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with
interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations
of the claimant to constitute “property” for Fifth Amendment purposes.
Id. at 124–25 (citation omitted).
The Court’s reliance on Pennsylvania Coal and wide legislative discretion in zoning
and other regulation shows much deference for government policies and regulations
furthering legislative purposes and objectives of public interests.
277 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385–86 (applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that
had been used during the substantive due process era).
278 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (applying common law reasoning that certain lands
were not restricted by common law principles and rules of real property and nuisance).
279 Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. at 302
(2002), with Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003, and Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
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heavily on an inductively pragmatic or practical approach that favored
giving deference to government and relying on a single takings propo-
sition or principle, such as diminution of value, to avoid disrupting gov-
ernment processes.280 With a full set of takings standards of review and
several takings principles as the backdrop, the Court differentiated and
eliminated several standards and principles to show why it should not
apply or create a categorical per se test.281 However, the Court left intact an
exercise of government power and economic circumstances mostly free of
the remedial limitation, namely the right to receive just compensation.282
The Court applied the Armstrong doctrine, but its practical or prag-
matic approach skewed the Armstrong analytical framework to favor less
rigorous or less direct scrutiny of questionable regulatory, policy, market,
and economic circumstances. Justifying and fashioning a deferential stan-
dard under the Armstrong doctrine in all or most circumstances will fail
to guarantee just compensation and its protection of property rights. In
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Court concluded that the burdens
imposed on government’s land use practices, policies, and policymaking
through government’s use of moratoria to redistribute public burdens and
benefits would be too great.283 The Court permits government to redistrib-
ute public burdens to landowners and permits burdensome government
regulation of use and development by relying on practical or pragmatic
reasons for favoring deferential scrutiny.284 The choice between per se and
deferential scrutiny in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council that was put
forth by the Court285 is begging the question of whether the need to pro-
tect the right to just compensation, the guarantor of fairness and justice,
would be better served by deferential, intermediate, or per se scrutiny.
Naturally, the Armstrong analytical framework should have included
protecting the right to just compensation, and if the moratoria under-
mine this guarantee to landowners, then the nature of connection or rele-
vance between the right to just compensation and the moratoria would
have determined the type or nature of the standard of review. In weigh-
ing germaneness, the impact on policies and policymaking of government
280 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 302.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 313.
283 Id. at 335–41. The Court was hesitant to impose an unnecessary burden on “informed
decisionmaking by regulatory agencies.” Id. at 338–39. The Court also sought to limit
takings analysis to fewer policy and regulatory circumstances. Id. at 335–38.
284 See, e.g., id. at 315.
285 Id. at 334.
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processes and procedures286 should be among the facts, forces, and circum-
stances to be analyzed and weighed by the Court. The fact that a per se
test would render normal government operations costly and make public
policy or decision making hasty287 should not be determinate, but weighed
in the mix of other circumstances likely to determine germaneness, so as
to avoid skewing the analytical framework.
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council applied Armstrong
doctrine, but left intact an outcome-determinative or overly relaxed stan-
dard of review and almost outcome-determinative takings principles.288
The Court applied Armstrong doctrine to reach a conclusion that greatly
favored the Penn Central inquiry’s reliance on value or another circum-
stance as determinative of the economic outcome of impact or investment-
backed expectations.289 Justice Stevens’s analysis and reasoning rest on
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo, in which she proffers
that the Court should rely on a case-by-case analysis,290 which is fact-
intensive and includes time and other circumstances, as the best analytical
approach.291 Property values or duration of moratoria are circumstances
that should rarely be a determinative factor under Armstrong doctrine.292
Moreover, the per se approach applied to economic circumstances and
transactions not foreseen or weighed by markets and policymaking shows
the Court’s inability to deal with the Framers’ patented lack of clairvoyance
and Court’s own inability to use foresight. The Court applied the Armstrong
286 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 337–38.
287 See id. at 335. However, Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), warned the Court against weighing too heavily the difficulty imposed on gov-
ernment when it intentionally or unintentionally destroys property rights. He stated: “We
are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change.” Id. at 416. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Court placed
great weight on the burden borne by government and forced landowners near Lake Tahoe
to shoulder the weight of this burden temporarily. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S.
at 302. This redistribution does not cause government to be more efficient in using re-
sources or more effective in achieving policy objectives, and thus will permit future un-
necessary bans on development to exist. Such temporary states of inactivity do not seem
to be consistent with Armstrong. See infra Part V.A and accompanying notes.
288 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 302.
289 See id. at 321.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 335 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
292 See, e.g., id. at 337 (“[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction
precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given
exclusive significance one way or the other.”).
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doctrine to weigh policy, economic, and regulatory circumstances in a facial
challenge, but saved established regulation and decision-making processes,
and ignored economic circumstances and protection from government
powers by permitting the redistribution of public burdens to landowners.293
V. RELYING ON DOCTRINE TO TEST MEANS AND ENDS OF
ESTABLISHED POLICIES
This part discusses the need to rely on firm constitutional doctrine
to test means and ends of distributing and redistributing the public bur-
dens and benefits of community policy-making for economic, political, and
social programs. Armstrong fairness and justice doctrine is more than
takings dicta that illuminates or illustrates the purpose of the Takings
Clause. This doctrine can go much further to protect the right to just
compensation that protects private property rights. Foremost, Armstrong
fairness and justice doctrine should weigh the need for more judicial scru-
tiny, both process and equity, in the fashioning and applying standards of
review and other takings principles in regulatory takings and other claims
resolved under the Takings Clause.
A. Supporting Armstrong and Its Application as a Doctrinal
Approach
The Armstrong doctrine must guide federal and state courts in
justifying standards of review and fashioning takings standards of review
and principles. Federal and state courts need standards and principles to
determine the weight or substantiality of landowner’s burdens, economic
effects, public interests, and community benefits in redistributing old and
distributing new public burdens to landowners and communities. These
courts need standards of review to weigh the nature of a “proportional
response” to the risk of public harm294 in protecting the right to just com-
pensation from government actions furthering public ends, even the in-
direct benefits or objectives. Armstrong doctrine can recalibrate existing
293 Id. at 337–38. The Court made several observations and findings to support its
conclusion. Excluding normal delays under a per se rule “would still impose serious
financial constraints on the planning process,” and interim development controls are an
“essential tool of successful development.” Id. at 337–38. The per se or categorical rule
ignored the “good faith of the planners, the reasonable expectations of the landowners,
or the actual impact of the moratorium on property values.” Id. at 338.
294 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 314 n.9.
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analytical frameworks that permit most any regulation or response to sur-
vive constitutional muster by using most any doctrine or substance to
weigh mostly economic effects and other regulatory circumstances.
The application of Armstrong doctrine in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council appears as mostly a pragmatic analytical framework to determine
whether moratoria are per se takings295 but comes to full fruition in justi-
fying, establishing, and fashioning any standard of review when the Court
assumes government judgment is mostly sacrosanct under all circum-
stances involving the right to just compensation.296 The Court relied on
the need to maintain conclusive policy-making and regulatory stability,
thus placing greater weight on the need to make and enforce land use
controls and other regulations.297 Following the theory of Pennsylvania
Coal298 to the most prescriptive outcome by giving the greater weight to
stable policymaking and policies avoids the need to draw any connection
to the protection of the right to just compensation.299 Narrowly, this only
shows the application or fit of a Lucas per se approach to a moratorium.300
In fact, this policymaking advantage creates a virtually inactive right to
just compensation by subjecting it to a judicial process with little or no
equity for the loss of property rights.301
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the dissent found the dura-
tion of the ban to be much longer than did the majority, but the dissent
offered no new doctrine to deal with new burdens of development and scar-
city, other than similarity to a past physical taking.302 The dissent consisted
295 Id. at 339–41.
296 See supra Part VI.A and accompanying notes (discussing the imbalance in the weight
assigned to government judgment and property rights that are limited and secured, respec-
tively, by the right to just compensation).
297 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 339–41.
298 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
299 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 325–26.
300 Id. at 326.
301 See Lopez, supra note 124, at 278–82 (finding the right to just compensation to be
ineffective under the Court’s takings jurisprudence giving deference to city and state
governments). In determining the standard of review for some policies and regulations,
theoretical-analytical doctrine may also justify a deferential review or general proposition
to further government’s judgment to protect underrepresented classes and groups in urban
and rural communities. See J. Peter Bryne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential
Communities Under the Takings Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 131, 136–38
(2005) (finding the need for a deferential review to support low-income residents in urban
neighborhoods, but advocating a broader interpretation of just compensation would be
more encompassing).
302 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 343, 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, and found that
the ban on all development lasted almost six years and did not appear to
be traditional land use policymaking.303 Doctrinally, the dissent would have
relied on physical takings doctrine and principles to establish a temporary
taking of possession and use by government, as in a leasehold or rental
period.304 The dissent relied on physical takings doctrine and its per se
approach to justify applying Lucas’s per se approach that is underpinned
by only common law doctrine operating to limit the power of the state to
protect the right to just compensation.305 Simply put, the dissent placed
greater weight on the duration of the ban and its resemblance to a physical
taking.306 The dissent relied on more constitutional doctrine and invoked
and rested on common law doctrine.307 However, Armstrong doctrine offers
substance, analysis, and reasoning to justify a per se or deferential analysis,
and does not assess whether a per se test fits a set of facts.308
B. Recognizing the Doctrinal Downside of Relying on Ad Hoc
Inquiry and Pragmatic Approach
The Armstrong doctrine ascertains whether the purpose of the
Takings Clause would be fulfilled by increasing or decreasing the level
of scrutiny courts apply to economic circumstances and policy influences
of property ownership and government policymaking.309 The Armstrong
doctrine of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council appears more pragmatic in
its analytical framework to resolve whether a particular taking is per se
or not under a particular regulatory scheme.310 Foremost, Armstrong
analysis includes an unavoidable scrutiny of the redistribution of particu-
lar public burdens.311 However, Armstrong doctrine is a double-edged blade
and cuts both ways. This doctrine can never accord lesser weight to any
public burden borne by government, even if the magnitude of the public
303 Id. at 343.
304 Id. at 346–48.
305 Id. at 349–51.
306 See id. at 343, 348.
307 Id. at 343.
308 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 268–69.
309 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 335–41; see also Holloway & Guy, supra note
1, at 263–64.
310 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 268–70.
311 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
2010] REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE 367
inconvenience would be costly under the Takings Clause.312 Ignoring
problematic or troublesome public burdens under any standards of review
allows government to avoid the payment of just compensation, thus precip-
itating a gradual destruction of private property rights by undermining
the right to just compensation.
When federal courts cannot totally agree or precisely determine the
nature of government actions, such as length of duration or nature of the
public burden,313 under any analytical framework for a regulatory takings
analysis, the takings standard of review or principle applied by these
courts cannot necessarily defer to the government policymakers. This
deference would be tantamount to siding with the thief when the stolen
property is consumed or destroyed by the thief for a personal or public
benefit. The Armstrong Court identified one of its concerns regarding
government actions erosive to personal property:
It is true that not every destruction or injury to property
by governmental action has been held to be a “taking” in
the constitutional sense. This case and many others reveal
the difficulty of trying to draw the line between what de-
structions of property by lawful governmental actions are
compensable “takings” and what destructions are “conse-
quential” and therefore not compensable.314
A default to deference clearly is not Armstrong. The Armstrong doctrine
must create standards of review and takings principles that can separate
the incidental and insubstantial burdens, and effects of government
actions from more disproportionate actions or responses regulating tradi-
tional exercises of private property. The Armstrong doctrine must include
analytical capability and substantive force to guide and control the growth
and development of Holmesian analytics and substance of regulatory
takings theory.315
C. Recognizing the Burdens and Benefits Distributed under
Regulation
The Armstrong doctrine justifies standards of review and princi-
ples to scrutinize and judge, respectively, a “valid regulatory measure”
312 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 290.
313 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
314 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48 (citation omitted).
315 Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 288–89.
368 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:315
that causes a loss of value, profit, or other interest that amounts to more
than incidental redistribution of public burdens and creation of public
benefits.316 The Armstrong doctrine justifies standards of review and
principles to scrutinize and judge, respectively, a “valid regulatory mea-
sure” that makes government the “direct, positive beneficiary” of a ban on
development and use restriction.317 These standards determine if the
public burdens redistributed to landowners and the benefits received by
government are more than a “mere ‘consequential incidence.’ ”318
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council illustrates how government
regulation, namely the moratorium, redistributes burdens and benefits
to the government, community, and landowners.319 Preserving Lake Tahoe
is a worthy cause, but its preservation preserves natural resources, namely
the lake and its watershed and water quality, thus conveying public bene-
fits and business advantages to government, landowners, and the com-
munity, and leaving other landowners with entirely new public burdens
and private hardships.320 The government moratoria preserving Lake
Tahoe maintain substantial aesthetic, social, and economic benefits that
will not be most beneficial to landowners who had their property rights
temporarily banned, permanently restricted, or totally destroyed by the
moratorium on development.321 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council relies
on the Armstrong doctrine in determining if an equitable redistribution of
burdens, and if sufficient judicial process to scrutinize this redistribution,
took place in conferring supposedly inconsequential benefits and advan-
tages on the public and landowners.322 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council’s
somewhat pragmatic approach in relying on Armstrong is not mistaken,
but misapplied by the Court.323
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR TRIGGERING AND APPLYING
ARMSTRONG DOCTRINE
Part VI discusses the need for unique takings doctrine to address
concerns regarding the distribution of public burdens and benefits via
316 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
320 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 291.
321 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 341; see also Holloway & Guy, supra note
1, at 281.
322 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 306–07.
323 See id.
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government regulation, which can substantially burden private property
rights. The burdens and benefits of government regulation must be reason-
ably certain or relatively understood in the context of their impact on the
right to receive just compensation.324 Although the impact of government
regulation is on property rights, the takings claim to either enjoin gov-
ernment or compensate landowners arises under the Takings Clause.325
A. Redistributing Burdens and Benefits as the Context for
Armstrong Doctrine
Takings doctrine must address both public burdens and benefits
of government regulation.326 Government regulation must not give bene-
fits to the public or landowners that could have not been conferred by a
private party in a market transaction.327 Notwithstanding the reciprocity
of advantages, the redistribution of a burden among the whole commu-
nity may not always justify the denial of just compensation.328 When the
community benefits gained include now-public resources and funds, this
relationship between a personal loss and a community boon demands
greater constitutional care to protect the right to just compensation.
The Armstrong doctrine encompasses the concepts of fairness and
justice to address burdens of regulation that cause a loss of property
value, profits, or other interests as well as to consider the advantages and
benefits conferred on government, the public, and other landowners.329
324 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 1, at 245.
325 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
326 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1991) (stating that a determination
of a taking “ ‘necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests ”) (quoting Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1979)).
327 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48–49 (1960).
328 See id. at 48. In Armstrong, Justice Black, writing for the majority, pointed out consti-
tutional concerns regarding benefits and advantages conferred on the public by regulation
when he wrote:
It was because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the
value of the liens, something that the Government could do because its
property was not subject to suit, but which no private purchaser could
have done. Since this acquisition was for a public use, however accom-
plished, whether with an intent and purpose of extinguishing the liens
or not, the Government’s action did destroy them.
Id.
329 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
320–21 (2002) (using Armstrong principles of justice and fairness to void petitioner’s
argument that a “temporary deprivation . . . of all economically viable use” constitutes
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These benefits and advantages are caused by government actions that
are destructive insomuch as they cause a loss of value, benefits, and
interests of private property.330 These benefits and advantages are un-
assailable if they do not come within the reach of the right to receive just
compensation under the Takings Clause.331 The Armstrong doctrine pro-
tects the right to just compensation by establishing a level of scrutiny to
determine if the equitable redistribution of public burdens is congruent
with either the indirect or direct public benefits taken by government.332
This redistribution must be set forth in proportionate government actions
or responses even though government must shoulder a burden it did not
intend to bear alone.333 Armstrong doctrine justifies the need for stan-
dards of review in weighing or considering both intended and unintended
public benefits and advantages that are gained by imposing reciprocal
burdens that are destructive to property rights.
B. Triggering the Application of Armstrong Doctrine in the Context
of Takings to Justify a Standard of Review
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Armstrong doctrine would
justify and determine whether moratoria on development that had existed
for three years to preserve natural resources and control development
undermined the right to just compensation.334 Foremost, a ban on develop-
ment for a temporary duration must show or demonstrate how its effects
on transfer and other property interests significantly differ from a perma-
nent ban that closes out real estate markets and denies transfers for sub-
stantial value.335 When a ban on development for a limited duration causes
a per se taking); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
702 (1998) (observing that “concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause”)
(citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
330 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1991).
331 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
332 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
333 See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702.
334 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 321–43 (holding that building
moratoria, preventing development, were not per se takings of property).
335 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37. In Nollan, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, stated:
Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of con-
tinuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it
were not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s assumed
power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s
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the same or similar market or transfer effects as a permanent ban, the
temporary ban would not be germane to the right to receive just compen-
sation where a permanent ban would frustrate efforts to transfer for in-
vestment or other business needs.336 The effects of this temporary ban
would not be entirely germane to the right to just compensation, but this
disconnect between a takings limitation and government regulation
would need to cause a forfeiture or loss of the benefits of this limitation,
namely the right to just compensation. This ban greatly restricts the right
to transfer by forcing market-exiting transfers, cannibalization of property
rights, indirect transfer of aesthetic benefits, unexpected limits on invest-
ment expectations, and other landowner burdens. The ban on development
also induces landowners and developers to exit real estate markets and
transfer land.337 Often, local government agencies, not-for-profit organi-
zations, or adjacent landowners are buyers of the untimely transfer of
the estate or one or more of its cannibalized rights, primarily for conser-
vation or other compatible uses.338 Yet, the right to just compensation is
a limit on government takings that should prevent public burdens and
other obligations from causing a transfer for less than fair market value
or extracting uncompensated public benefits. Therefore, the Armstrong
doctrine would first determine if such a temporary ban on development
lacks enough germaneness or connection to the right to just compensa-
tion to require strict, intermediate, or deferential scrutiny, which, in
turn, would determine the protection afforded to private property rights.
view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construction
upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights,
that serves the same end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that
purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a
taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alter-
native to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not.
Id.
336 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 316 n.12 (describing the value and
sale of environmentally sensitive land before the expiration of moratoria); Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. at 700 (“The State of California’s purchase of the property during the
pendency of the litigation may have bolstered the credibility of Del Monte Dunes’
position.”).
337 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). The Penn
Central inquiry sees the property estate as a whole subject to regulation, but permits bifur-
cation of the estate by regulation to cannibalize and transfer the right to development.
See id.
338 See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 698–702 (describing eventual transfer of land
subject to an extraordinarily long moratorium on development).
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C. Using Armstrong Doctrine to Place Regulation in a Takings
Context
Removing temporary bans from the protection of the right to just
compensation leaves little deterrent to takings by, what can be, the most
burdensome of government actions.339 Landowners can be subtly forced
to exercise the right to transfer for value, or take a lesser return on invest-
ment in real estate transactions from government agencies or not-for-
profits that acquire the land for aesthetics, conservation, or other purposes
with a lesser investment potential. The transactions forced by government
regulation subtly redistribute aesthetic and economic benefits to adjoining
or other landowners at no cost to government or its agencies.340 This is a
transfer of value in enjoyment, such as aesthetics, open space, and other
benefits, and may go unnoticed or out of reach by the just compensation
guarantee in regulatory takings disputes.
The right to just compensation should limit or prohibit induced or
forced transfers341 that include a redistribution of substantial property
benefits by government regulation when the transfer of these benefits
are accompanied by greatly diminished land value caused by eliminating
the most immediate and obvious financial expectations,342 such as retire-
ment income. Protecting the right to just compensation requires scrutiny
of the government’s redistribution of burdens and benefits caused by bans
on development closely followed or accompanied by land transfers. This
protection requires scrutiny: a rational basis under Penn Central,343 inter-
mediate scrutiny under Dolan,344 or per se under Lucas.345 Presumably, the
339 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 321–43 (discussing how a tem-
porary moratorium can not be considered a taking without analyzing the particular facts
and circumstances).
340 See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 741–42 (1996) (recognizing
that government can bear the risk of loss when it enters land markets to further a
regulatory scheme).
341 See id. at 741 (recognizing that the right to transfer is of some importance in the bundle
of rights and the impact of government regulation on transfer of rights and land for value).
But see Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (recognizing the inter vivos right to transfer
does cut off the rights of descent and devise in the bundle of rights).
342 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001) (citing Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)); 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01
(rev. 3d ed. 2000)).
343 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
344 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1993).
345 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1991).
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justification for lesser or heightened scrutiny for various types of emerg-
ing and evolving government actions shall always be an ongoing federal
question—so long as the public does not succumb to the tyranny of land-
owners and policymakers.
To protect the guarantees of the right to just compensation, a mora-
torium banning substantially all development, with the effect of forcing
an exit from land markets, demands that the courts apply constitutional
doctrine to determine, justify, and fashion the most appropriate level of
scrutiny and standard of review.346 The Armstrong doctrine has the
potential to determine, justify, and fashion the most appropriate analytical
framework within which to protect the right to compensation, which, in
turn, ensures that the protection of property rights is consistent with the
purpose and intent of the Constitution, and not merely the immediate
public or private wants.347
CONCLUSION
We ultimately propose that land use, real estate, and constitutional
law attorneys should consider using the Armstrong fairness and justice
of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Palazzolo to determine, justify,
and fashion proportionate standards of review for regulatory takings
claims. Armstrong fairness and justice doctrine may permit a jurispru-
dential compromise that permits the Court to seek an analytical frame-
work with less confusing conclusions on regulatory takings disputes. As
a much-needed starting point, the Armstrong fairness and justice doc-
trine is an opportunity for the Court to look first to the Constitution, and
346 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321–43 (2002).
347 See id. at 332–33. The Court used Armstrong to create a per se test that is much more
stringent than intermediate scrutiny, and which requires government to advance a sub-
stantial interest once moratoria extend beyond one year. Id. The Court acknowledged that
Armstrong applies to “partial takings as well as total takings.” Id. at 332 n.27. We argue
that the full potential of Armstrong would not be realized if the Court were to restrict
Armstrong to determining the need for a per se test, but not using it to determine the appro-
priate level of scrutiny for ascertaining whether a lengthy moratorium is a “proportional
response to a serious risk of harm,” to the community. Id. at 334. A categorical or per se
test is an extremely strict means-ends test that permits few, if any, government ends to
justify the imposition of a particular burden, such as the loss of all beneficial use, see Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), or a physical occupation with permission
of government. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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second at land use practices and common law rules, to develop takings
doctrine. Generally, a few limitations on government’s powers and in-
exact reviews of newly created government means for taking private
property permit government to avoid paying just compensation and thus
undermine the Takings Clause.
The fairness and justice doctrine of Armstrong must be more than
a cleverly pragmatic invocation by the Stevens Coalition to justify mora-
toria and other restrictive land use regulations. We believe that Armstrong
has more to offer. It could be the foundation upon which to fashion takings
doctrine consistent with the political purpose and jurisprudential nature
of the Takings Clause. Such foundation would not be based on, but would
underpin the common law, economics, and land use practices underlying
takings doctrine, and thus could go far beyond the takings doctrine of
Pennsylvania Coal. Moreover, Armstrong can further the constitutional
guidance of Penn Central in justifying and developing an ad hoc approach
and takings principles to determine the existence of regulatory takings
where public needs are evident in the face of scarcity and the redistribution
of public burdens can potentially affect every other person equitably in a
community. Therefore, Armstrong provides fairness and justice in fashion-
ing a proportional regulatory response to development-induced risk of
harm or degradation, and provides fairness and justice in creating a bal-
ance in imposing economic burdens to secure public interests. Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council and Palazzolo can actually offer doctrine to
strengthen the foundation of takings jurisprudence by protecting the
right to receive just compensation.
Notwithstanding some inductive uncertainty, the Armstrong
fairness and justice doctrine offers the best hope, in the aftermath of
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, to justify and fashion
takings standards of review complementary to the pragmatic or ad hoc
approach of Penn Central; the Armstrong doctrine can justify, fashion, and
coalesce takings principles to further the doctrine of Pennsylvania Coal.
The applications of Armstrong in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and
Palazzolo found and supported, respectively, proportionality under the
Penn Central inquiry and the Lucas per se test. In both cases, the consid-
eration of the nature of government action and its economic impacts on
investment-backed expectations strongly indicates the creation of more
than unessential case law or superfluous dicta. Instead, Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council and Palazzolo elevate Armstrong’s widely quoted
language, embodying the purpose and intent of the Takings Clause, to
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the level of basic, inherent takings doctrine. Treated as such, Armstrong
can determine, justify, and fashion badly needed proportionate standards
of review and other takings principles to resolve claims arising under the
Takings Clause and the regulatory takings theory of Pennsylvania Coal.
